


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REPRESENTATION AND RACE IN AMERICA'S
VOLUNTEER MILITARY

MARK J. EITELBERG

September 1986

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<p>This monograph addresses a question that is as old as civilized society. Who among the people of a nation should be its "guardians"? Who should have the right or responsibility for shouldering the burdens of national defense?</p> <p>The concept of "representation" is first introduced, with reference to its application within the American military. Basic issues are then examined for three general areas of national policy: social equity, political legitimacy, and military effectiveness. Several competing themes are found, and the author suggests that a "reasonable balance" may be the only way to reconcile differences between opposing policy objectives.</p> <p>The discussion of issues and conflicts sets the stage for the main subject of the monograph, participation by blacks in the all-volunteer military. Modern trends in racial representation are reviewed, including the recent surge in enlistments by blacks.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Continued)</p>			
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The possible causes and contributing factors for these trends are also evaluated. The discussion then turns to racial representation questions for the 1980s--focusing on race and equity, race and effectiveness (using individual quality and performance indicators), and aspects of unit performance. Various "running currents of thought" are identified in an essay tracing the participation by blacks in the military from colonial times to present. The author finds that many "currents" have persistently followed the military through its entire past, and most will continue to run for some time to come. In a concluding note, the author offers a positive, yet cautionary outlook for the future. (The monograph presents fourteen statistical tables and numerous bibliographic references in footnote form.)

Foreword

Representation and Race in America's Volunteer Military addresses an issue that is as old as civilized society. Who among the people of a nation should be its "guardians"? Who should have the right or responsibility for shouldering the burdens of national defense?

This monograph was originally written in June 1981 and revised in November 1983. However, portions of the work have been amended to encompass more recent trends and developments, including the results of new research. A major section on "Currents of Thought Through American History" was also added.

The work has never before been presented in its complete form, though excerpts of the original manuscript appear in the following publications: M. Binkin and M. J. Eitelberg, with A. J. Schexnider and M. M. Smith, Blacks and the Military (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982); M. J. Eitelberg and M. Binkin, "Military Service in American Society," in Toward a Consensus on Military Service, A. J. Goodpaster, L. H. Elliot, and J. A. Hovey, Jr., eds. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1982); Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Active Duty Military Services, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], June 1985); and M. Binkin and M. J. Eitelberg, "Women and Minorities in the All-Volunteer Force," in The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade, W. Bowman, R. Little, and G. T. Sicilia, eds. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986).

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Representation and Race in America's Volunteer Military

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Representation and Race in America's Volunteer Military

"Representation," it has been said, means more in the United States than in any other nation. E Pluribus Unum--From Many One--is more than just a motto of the Great Seal. It signifies and typifies the American self-image: a nation where unity can be achieved amid social and political diversity; where, in a land of immigrants, people of many backgrounds can live in harmony and come together for a common cause; and where, in democratic fashion, the nation's great institutions can be called upon to re-present, or present again, the varied community interests and characteristics of the multitude. As Herman Melville wrote in 1849, "You can not spill a drop of American blood without spilling the blood of the whole world. . . . No: our blood is as the flood of the Amazon, made up of a thousand noble currents all pouring into one. We are not a nation, so much as a world. . . ." ¹

The U.S. Armed Forces have always emphasized the diversity of their membership. It is in the nature of the military organization to bring together young men and women from all states and territories, all major demographic groups and social categories, all races, religions, and ethnic backgrounds--the "blood of the whole world"--to serve in defense of the country and its guiding principles. Popular literature and the mass media have helped to foster this image of the American military as a sort of miniature melting pot, or perfect blending of all distinctive traditions and cultural patterns. Moreover, the recent spread of interest in military "representation" has functioned to convert the image into a national policy goal.

The seeming paradox lies in the fact that the American Armed Forces have never been truly representative of the civilian population. Conscription has never produced representation in the military (even though it may be capable of the task). It is even

¹Herman Melville, Redburn: His First Voyage (Boston: L. C. Page & Company, 1924), p. 169.

less likely that representation could ever occur under an all-volunteer format.

Of course, the ideal of a perfectly representative military--a so-termed "microcosmic replica" of the general population--is an illusion. Besides the myriad differences between subgroups within gross classifications of groups, and subgroups within subgroups of groups, it is clear that a sample of individuals in any corresponding subdivision of the population would be at least biased by those who have certain skills, attributes, interests, and personality traits. The ideal of perfect representation within any highly specialized institution is probably not even desirable. The case of the lunatic is the favorite example used by political philosophers to illustrate this point, but there are many others.²

Nevertheless, direct references to military "representation" appear in numerous Defense Department studies and reports, statements and testimony by government officials, Congressional and Executive Department documents, newspaper articles and editorials, "think-tank" research monographs, popular magazines, academic journals, public commentary, and general literature in the Social Sciences.³ The term has become a permanent part of the military

²There is an opposite view. A former U.S. Senator, for example, once remarked during the confirmation hearings of a 1970 nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States that Justices of the Supreme Court should "represent mediocrity." A. H. Birch, in Representation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, p. 59), quotes a similar statement by a British Lord during a television interview: "Ideally, the House of Commons should be a social microcosm of the nation. The nation has a great many people who are rather stupid, and so should the House."

³Kenneth J. Coffey and Frederick J. Reeg, "Representational Policies in the U.S. Armed Forces," in Defense Manpower Commission, Staff Studies and Supporting Papers, Vol. 3: Military Recruitment and Accessions and the Future of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1976), p. D-12. See also Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," Armed Forces and Society 1 (November 1974): 109-122; Alvin J. Schexnider and John S. Butler, "Race and the All-Volunteer System: A Reply to Janowitz and Moskos," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Spring 1976): 421-432;

Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional or Plural," Pacific Sociological Review 16 (1973): 255-280; Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the Armed Forces," Annals 406 (March 1973): 94-106; Morris Janowitz, "Blacks in the Military: Are There Too Many?" Focus 3 (June 1975): 3-5; Morris Janowitz, "The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Force," Annals 406 (March 1973): 86-93; Morris Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer Military as a 'Sociopolitical' Problem," Social Problems 2 (February 1975): 432-449; William R. King, Achieving America's Goals: The All-Volunteer Force or National Service?, Report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977); Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, R-1450-ARPA (Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corporation, September 1977); Mark J. Eitelberg, Evaluation of Army Representation, TR-77-A-9 (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1977); Mark J. Eitelberg, "American Youth and Military Representation: In Search of the Perfect Portrait," Youth and Society 10 (September 1978): 5-31; John C. Woelfel and David R. Segal, A Comparison of Selected Demographic Characteristics of the Army and Civilian Populations (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1976); David R. Segal and Bernard L. Daina, The Social Representativeness of the Volunteer Army, Research Memorandum 75-12 (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1975); Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977); David Boorstin, "Volunteer Army," Editorial Research Reports 7 (20 June 1975): 443-462; Sar A. Levitan and Karen C. Alderman, Warriors at Work: The Volunteer Armed Force (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1977); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Enlisted Ranks in the All-Volunteer Army," Paper Prepared for the Military in American Society Study, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., January 1978 (Processed); Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978," Armed Forces and Society 5 (Winter 1979): 171-218; Alvin J. Schexnider, "The Black Experience in the American Military," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Winter 1978): 329-334; Sar A. Levitan and Karen C. Alderman, "The Military as Employer: Past Performance, Future Prospects," Monthly Labor Review 100 (November 1977): 19-23; Department of Defense, America's Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], 31 December 1978), pp. 35-39; "Worse Than the Draft," Editorial, New York Times, 26 January 1977, p. A-22; George C. Wilson, "Black Ratio in Army Highest Ever," Washington Post, 17 October 1976, p. A-2; George C. Wilson, "Blacks in the Army Increase 50 Percent Since Draft," Washington

manpower vernacular, and no discussion of the Armed Forces is complete today without some mention of social demography, "proportional distributions," or "statistical parity."

Although the concept of military representation is relatively modern, the basic theory has been a part of political thought for hundreds of years.⁴ Indeed, in this country it has become a keystone of democracy--an assurance of constitutional behavior and political equilibrium in the pluralist society--spreading slowly from the political sphere throughout the social framework of the nation. In the 1940s, representation theory was applied to the bureaucracy, and during the 1960s, within the military context.⁵ The issue of representation currently manifests itself in many ways, including numerical hiring and placement policies in education and employment (such as "affirmative action"); in "balanced" political party tickets; in public concern over ethnic,

Post, 2 May 1978, p. A-16; "Can We Afford a Volunteer Army?," Editorial, New York Times, 18 May 1978, p. A-22; "Misgivings About the Volunteer Army," Editorial, New York Times, 2 January 1979, p. A-14; "Who'll Fight for America," Time, 9 June 1980, p. 36; John M. Swomley, Jr., "Too Many Blacks? The All-Volunteer Force," The Christian Century, 1 October 1980, pp. 902-903; Military Manpower Task Force, A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1982); and numerous other references in the popular media, academic journals, research monographs, and government reports.

⁴See Mark. J. Eitelberg, Military Representation: The Theoretical and Practical Implications of Population Representation in the American Armed Forces, Doctoral Dissertation, New York University, October 1979; Hannah F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1967); Hannah F. Pitkin, ed., Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1969); A. H. Birch, Representation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

⁵J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow Springs, Oh.: Antioch Press, 1944); Harry Kranz, The Participatory Bureaucracy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976); Samuel Krislov, The Negro in Federal Employment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967); Samuel Krislov, Representative Bureaucracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974); William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1971).

racial, and female appointments to public office; in the minority and women's rights movements; and in symbolic portrayals of the American people covering everything from war memorials to postage stamps.

1. THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY REPRESENTATION: BASIC ISSUES AND CONFLICTS

At the heart of the issue of military representation in this country is the concept of the "citizen soldier" and the democratic imperative, asserted by George Washington, that "every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property but even of his personal services to the defence of it. . . ." ⁶ In fact, from the armies of the Roman Republic through the French levee en masse and post-Revolutionary thought in America, to the present-day controversy over voluntary recruitment, it is the idea that all citizens share an equal responsibility of service to the nation that underpins the fundamental principle of proportional participation.

The importance attributed to various themes or elements of military service ordinarily shifts together with changes in the political and social setting. Since 1945, for example, manpower issues have focused on national security, budgetary considerations, and practical expediency (that is, compulsory service). ⁷ "Equality of service" grew out of the citizen-soldier concept around the period just prior to World War I; yet, before the 1960s, equity was seldom ever a major factor in manpower policy decisions. A combination of civil rights and antiwar protests, "quota

⁶George Washington, "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment" in Walter Millis, ed., American Military Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966), p. 23.

⁷See James L. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971).

consciousness," and public response to inequities in the Selective Service System led to extensive draft reform, the draft lottery, and the eventual demise of conscription. At the same time, as a result of these social forces, a new public awareness of the military establishment developed--an awareness and interest in the means as well as the outcomes of defense manpower policy. Furthermore, it was a concern for the social consequences of manpower policy decisions that helped to reshape methods of recruitment and to popularize the concept of "military representation."

"Representation," some thus contend, can provide a definitive answer to the longstanding question: "Who shall serve when not all serve?" Fairness can be assured to the extent that the few who do serve in the military compose a cross section of all who are equally obligated to defend the nation; and one can assume that military responsibilities are distributed impartially across all sectors of society when identified groups are present in proportion to their presence in the total population--that is, when membership of the military is mathematically similar in some way to the nation's citizenry.

Equity issues are by far the most commonly discussed feature of participation in the present all-volunteer military. This is largely the result of the highly disproportionate percentage of blacks in the Army and, to a lesser extent, the perceived differences in the social class distribution of the enlisted force and the general population. Ironically, while the exclusion of blacks from the military ignited modern discussion of "equality of service," it is their overrepresentation that dominates most commentary today. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the burdens of military service were seen to outweigh the benefits, and equal opportunity gave way to "equal representation"--protecting the disadvantaged and certain depressed minority groups, such as blacks, from bearing a disproportionate burden of the defense of the nation.

Concepts regarding the political legitimacy of the American Armed Forces also involve issues of military representation. The general principle of a citizen's obligation to serve in the military is still a popular and controversial topic of debate. Borrowing from a classic theory of accountability in government, the "subjective" (or "informal internal") model of military accountability suggests that population diversity, or a balanced mix of civilian-community values, can provide a naturally effective means of legitimate direction and control. The "subjective" model appears as a recurrent theme in academic research, despite the fact that methods for evaluating the direct consequences of representation have always been problematic. Most treatments of the relationship between population participation and accountability within the military organization continue to center on standard demographic characteristics, but there is a growing tendency to place greater emphasis on the significance of personal attitudes.

Military representation, especially when it pertains to elements of individual "quality," is often linked with military effectiveness. When the modern draft ended, there was no yardstick for assessing the aggregate degree of quality possessed by new enlistees. The aptitude test scores and educational level of the draft-era force were at first accepted as the criteria of recruiting success under the new, all-volunteer system--mainly because the draft offered a visible reference point and, so many believed, all-volunteer recruitment had to prove it could at least match the draft in this respect. Eventually, the national population of military-age youths became the sacred touchstone for appraising recruit attributes; and quality representation--that is, having no less than the national proportion of high school graduates and no lower than the national average score on the military's aptitude test--was equated with the minimum needs of the Armed Forces.

It is not clear that quality representation per se affects overall military performance or organizational efficiency. The disproportionate representation of persons with certain social

and economic characteristics, on the other hand, may adversely influence the effectiveness of the force. Empirical research on this subject is insufficient. In any case, there are several thought-provoking theories of the potentially harmful consequences of socioeconomic imbalances, and they have contributed to public apprehension about all-volunteer participation.

Thus, expressions of concern regarding the membership composition of the American Armed Forces have focused on three general areas of national policy: social equity, political legitimacy, and military effectiveness. Just the same, these various expressions of concern are not founded on indisputable, axiomatic truths. Value conflicts both between and within these three categories are quite prevalent. Each theme is heavily value-freighted, containing a variety of possible meanings and measures, along with a full range of equally justified, yet essentially opposed, arguments. The result is a hodge-podge of representation theory, a conglomeration of naysayers and advocates with no particularly distinct political or ideological linkages, much normative jousting, and little solid evidence.

The knottiest value conflict today may be found in the so-called "benefits vs. burdens" controversy. Equity perceptions are strongly influenced by the assumed ratio of benefits to burdens in military service. When the burdens of enlistment are seen to outweigh the benefits, attention is focused on social class distinctions; and, any overrepresentation of economically disadvantaged individuals is viewed as evidence of some injustice. Conversely, when the benefits of military service overbalance perceived burdens, it has been suggested that the achievement of true social equity occurs through the overrepresentation of the disadvantaged poor and racial minorities.

Added to this is the understanding that "benefits" and "burdens" are themselves subjective, culture-bound concepts, which may bear no relationship to the conditions of war or peace. For example, in the history of this nation, immigrants, the sansei (during World War II), and blacks have placed great importance on

the "right to fight" and wartime service; exclusion from combat duty was a denial of full citizenship and, therefore, equality. At the same time, in the absence of conflict and compulsory service--with opportunity for technical training, education, social development and mobility, personal fulfillment, job experience, fair compensation, and steady employment--military membership is described by some in largely negative terms. In fact, present discussions of representation in the all-volunteer military have not concentrated on disproportionate black enlistments because whites are being denied a just share of the benefits--but, rather, because depressed minorities are viewed as victims of a system that forces them to carry an unjust share of the burdens to obtain the benefits.

Moreover, because the all-volunteer military is portrayed by some as an "employer of last resort"--a haven for life's assorted losers--it is failing to advance or improve its attraction for a wider cross section of society. The resocialization of poverty youths, it is said, depends on public acceptance of the military as a legitimate activity for everyone, not just special segments of the population.⁸ So, even though the disadvantaged can find some sort of temporary relief in a military job, the full value of any opportunities for these young people may be lost without cross-sectional representation.

Yet another area of conflict is found between the objectives of equal opportunity and proportional representation. "Equal opportunity" (treating everyone alike) and representation are often associated with particular minority groups, women, and the struggle for civil rights. But equal opportunity is a concept that relates to the individual: rights attach to the individual, and individual opportunity, as opposed to group opportunity, means that all persons are judged solely on the basis of their personal qualifications. Representation conversely classifies individuals according to groups; it draws attention to stereo-

⁸Moskos, "The Enlisted Ranks," p. 57.

typical qualities as people are placed in statistical categories based on distinctive group traits or identifiable characteristics; and it encourages, rather than obviates, consciousness of innate group differences.

"Political legitimacy" stands out as one of the oldest, most deeply rooted themes of military representation. Compulsory service follows on the heels of legitimacy arguments, since it is the only manpower recruitment system capable of ensuring universal citizen participation. But, conscription violates the standard of free choice; and forms of conscription in this country have been characteristically unfair, drawing from limited, nonuniversal manpower pools.

Theories of political legitimacy are at least as old as the birth of the nation. Nevertheless, an array of exclusionary practices, inequitable standards, and quotas have historically prohibited military participation by people in certain identified groups. Black Americans, for example, were restricted from full participation and subject to special enlistment quotas until only about thirty years ago. Participation by women is presently regulated for the stated purposes of military effectiveness and practical necessity (the same reasons once given for limiting participation by blacks). At any rate, the special exclusion of women implies that women are "second-class" citizens, and it is difficult to argue that political legitimacy objectives--or universal citizen service--can ever be fully realized unless women are treated and accepted in the Armed Forces on an equal basis with men.

The sociopolitical environment and a complex of value judgments affect popular perceptions of representation. These perceptions in turn influence the choice of statistics for comparison and subsequent appraisals of the military's membership. The current controversy over the representativeness of the volunteer force illustrates how certain views concerning the military organization may guide assessments of recruiting results. The "occupational model" of the volunteer military, for example, suggests

that the distinction between enlisted and officer positions in the Armed Forces is analogous to the distinction between blue-collar and white-collar jobs in the civilian sector. On the other hand, the "institutional model," which describes military service as a universal obligation of citizenship (or a "calling"), sets the Armed Forces apart from civilian working life and does not separate the organization along occupational or class lines.⁹ Obviously, the social demography of the civilian labor force and its various subdivisions differs from that of the general population (especially among the younger, so-called military-age population); and studies of military representation will clearly yield different results when, say, enlistees are compared with civilian blue-collar workers instead of young adults in the national population. Entirely opposite conclusions can thus result in evaluations of the same military data--depending on how one sees the military (or defines its purpose) and selects the various population standards for comparison.

Military "effectiveness" likewise involves a set of goals that conflict with representation. Perfect representation, for instance, would require that the military duplicate the educational levels, aptitude distribution, physical attributes, and moral profile of the general population--enlisting the services of some people who are now found mentally, medically, or morally unfit. But military manpower managers seek to recruit candidates on the basis of their qualifications, not representation; qualified individuals make good soldiers or sailors, it is said, because they are qualified. Efficiency, performance, trainability, discipline, motivation, leadership, and the like are the criteria military managers use to evaluate force ability. The Services thus strive to recruit "the most of the best" young men and women during any given year, while military needs are used to justify

⁹The "institutional vs. occupational" formulation is attributed to Charles C. Moskos. See, for example, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," Armed Forces and Society 4 (Fall 1977): 41-50.

the "quality mix" of enlistees as well as the standards for selection and placement.

It is important to understand that the goals of military effectiveness are tied to the goals of equity and legitimacy. As an agent of the government, the military must comply with the requirements for equity, and it must obviously be held to legitimate direction and control. Just the same, in order to effectively protect and defend these national guiding principles, the military must fulfill its own peculiar organizational requirements. Hence, there is the classic confrontation between means and ends: military effectiveness requires that certain standards be used to pick the best candidates and make suitable job assignments; however, national principles and priorities simultaneously demand that the Armed Forces do all in their power to be a reflection or microcosmic image of society.

A reasonable balance of opposing objectives may be the only way to reconcile differences between benefits and burdens, internal organizational needs and external national goals, equal opportunity and proportional representation, compulsions and freedoms, and other areas of variance. A trade-off or compromise is similarly needed to settle fundamental conflicts between equity, legitimacy, and effectiveness. And, yet, any attempt to bridge the gap between clashing principles (philosophical or practical) will call for its own healthy share of subjective interpretation. After all, how does one strike a balance between realistic military needs or requirements and the recognized social good? Can one, or should one, even attempt to balance and trade between separate categories of demands on the nation and the body politic? Indeed, what is "reasonable"?

These are all questions that have characteristically followed the history of manpower policy and race relations in the American military--questions that may well be as old as the very origins of organized armies.¹⁰ During the past few years, the search for

¹⁰See Eitelberg, Military Representation.

an equitable and effective recruiting policy has been urged on by the swelling proportion of blacks and other minorities in the Armed Forces. At the same time, a new awareness of the interrelationship between the military and society has helped to draw the lines of discord between the proponents of conscription and the defenders of voluntary service. The military has thus become a symbol of the society, a manifestation of equity; and as a public institution, its composition is seen to symbolically reflect social justice or injustice.

Ironically, while the underrepresentation and exclusion of blacks from the military ignited modern discussions of equality of service, it is their overrepresentation that dominates debate today. "Equality of service" once meant getting blacks into the Armed Forces; now it has come to mean, benignly, keeping blacks out.

2. RACIAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA'S VOLUNTEER MILITARY

There were various references to the potential "problems" of participation by blacks during the early days of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) debate; but it was the final report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (or the "Gates Commission") and its treatment of "objections against the AVF" that provided the first official government acknowledgment of the "representation" matter. The Gates Commission report highlighted several contemporary issues that were directly related to questions of "complete" citizen participation--including the "frequently heard claim that a volunteer force will be all black or all this or all that."¹¹

The Commission's "best projections for the future" were that blacks would constitute 14.9 percent of enlisted males in the entire military, and that the proportion of black enlistees in

¹¹President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 15.

the Army would be approximately 18.8 percent by the year 1980.¹² "To be sure, these are estimates," the Commission asserted, "but even extreme assumptions would not change the figures drastically."¹³ The Commission left little room for doubt.

If the proponents of voluntary service had not been so emphatic in their predictions of "proportional representation" under the new all-volunteer system, perhaps the reactions of critics and skeptics would not have been so severe. By the end of 1974, it became obvious that certain social categories were not enlisting in the military at predicted levels; and the "broad appeal" of military service, it appeared, did not extend quite as far as many Defense analysts and AVF partisans had originally envisioned. The most conspicuous statistic was the sudden leap in the proportion of black enlisted accessions in the Army.

During the phase-out of compulsory service, the relative number of black volunteers increased steadily, though slowly. In Fiscal 1974, however, the proportion of black recruits in the Army jumped unexpectedly to an unprecedented high of 27 percent--almost double the proportion of black Army recruits in 1970, the year the Gates Commission predicted that "the composition of the military will not be fundamentally changed by ending conscription."¹⁴ In fact, all Services displayed increases in the number of blacks, as the proportion of new recruits who were black went from 13 percent in 1970 to 21 percent just four years later.¹⁵

The situation was described in a Congressional Research Service publication:

¹²Ibid., p. 147

¹³Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Kenneth J. Coffey et al., "The Impact of Socio-Economic Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," in Defense Manpower Commission, Staff Studies and Supporting Papers, Vol. 3: Military Recruitment and Accessions and the Future of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1976), p. E-12.

DoD has repeatedly stated that it is not concerned with the racial breakdown of the Armed Forces and regards any action taken to limit enlistments by race as a violation of the concept that each individual must be measured on his own worth regardless of color. Congress, however, continues to be concerned that the Armed Forces may be becoming disproportionately composed of individuals who have lower socio-economic status or who are members of racial/ethnic minorities.¹⁶

The Defense Manpower Commission was created by Congress in 1973 and directed to conduct a comprehensive study of the overall manpower requirements of the Department of Defense, including "the implications for the ability of the Armed Forces to fulfill their mission as a result of the change in the socioeconomic composition of military enlistees since the enactment of new recruiting policies provided for in Public Law 92-129 and the implications for national policies of this change in the composition of the Armed Forces."¹⁷ About the same time, the Department of Defense was instructed by the Senate Armed Services Committee to perform a continuing study of "population representation" in the military and report its findings to Congress at the end of each fiscal year.¹⁸

During the past few years, the "representation" issue has come to be associated primarily with the overrepresentation of

¹⁶See Robert L. Goldich, "All-Volunteer Military Force," Issue Brief Number IB73021 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1973), p. 4.

¹⁷Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1976), p. 156.

¹⁸The Congressional directive appears in Senate Armed Services Committee Report Number 94-884, May 1974. See Department of Defense, Population Representation in the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics]; [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics]; and [Force Management and Personnel], 1974 to present).

blacks in the Army.¹⁹ Of course, participation by blacks is one of the oldest, most enduring military manpower "problems." But the recent interest is perhaps best explained by the fact that the steadily rising level of black enlistments accompanied the removal of certain Selective Service controls over the social composition of the military--controls which, in one form or another, had always been accessible during the short history of an integrated force.

As Table 1 shows, all Services entered the 1980s with a greatly increased proportion of black personnel. In the Army, the proportion of blacks increased with each successive year during the 1970s. At the end of Fiscal 1983, almost one out of every three soldiers was black--three times the percentage of blacks in 1949, the year before the Army submitted a plan to remove its racial quota. Blacks constituted lower proportions in the other Services; still, close to 20 percent of all those on active duty were black, a proportion substantially greater than the architects of the all-volunteer military had ever anticipated.

The year 1980 was used by the Gates Commission research staff as a focal point for its manpower projections. The Commission staff estimated the future participation of blacks in the new AVF by examining the projected pool of young men available for military service, the proportion of young men able to pass mental and physical standards, first-term participation rates, and reenlistment behavior. The Commission's projections ("best estimates") were based on the assumption that (1) the projected proportion of black young men available for military service would increase (in comparison with a lower rate of growth for the pool of white youths); (2) the proportion of black males qualified for military service would rise from 53 percent to 63 percent; (3) the effect of a 40-percent pay increase on black participation rates would be smaller (by a factor of 0.25) than the effect on white participation rates (because "a larger proportion of the

¹⁹Coffey and Reeg, "Representational Policy," p. 83.

TABLE 1

Blacks as a Percentage of the Active Duty Military,
by Service, Selected Years, 1942-83^a

Fiscal Year	Army			Navy			Marine Corps			Air Force			All Services		
	Enlisted	Officer	Total	Enlisted	Officer	Total	Enlisted	Officer	Total	Enlisted	Officer	Total	Enlisted	Officer	Total
1942 ^b	6.2	0.3	5.8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	b	b	b	N/A	N/A	N/A
1945 ^b	9.3	0.8	8.4	4.8	0.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	b	b	b	N/A	N/A	N/A
1949	11.1	1.9	10.1	4.4	*	4.0	2.5	*	2.3	6.1	0.6	5.3	7.5	0.9	6.7
1964	11.8	3.3	10.9	5.9	0.3	5.3	8.7	0.3	7.9	10.0	1.5	8.6	9.7	1.8	8.7
1968	12.6	3.3	11.5	5.0	0.4	4.5	11.5	0.9	10.7	10.2	1.8	8.9	10.2	2.1	9.2
1970	13.5	3.4	12.1	5.4	0.7	4.8	11.2	1.3	10.2	11.7	1.7	10.0	11.0	2.2	9.8
1971	14.3	3.6	12.9	5.4	0.7	4.8	11.4	1.3	10.4	12.3	1.7	10.5	11.4	2.3	10.7
1972	17.0	3.9	15.0	6.4	0.9	5.7	13.7	1.5	12.5	12.6	1.7	10.8	12.6	2.3	11.1
1973	18.4	4.0	16.3	7.7	1.1	6.8	16.9	1.9	15.4	13.4	2.0	11.5	14.0	2.5	12.4
1974	21.3	4.5	19.0	8.4	1.3	7.5	18.1	2.4	16.5	14.2	2.2	12.1	15.7	2.8	13.9
1975	22.2	4.8	19.9	8.0	1.4	7.2	18.1	3.0	16.7	14.6	2.5	12.5	16.1	3.1	14.3
1976	24.3	5.3	21.9	8.1	1.6	7.3	17.0	3.5	15.6	14.7	2.8	12.7	16.9	3.5	15.1
1977	26.4	6.1	23.9	8.7	1.9	7.9	17.6	3.6	16.2	14.7	3.2	12.7	17.9	4.0	16.0
1978	29.2	6.4	26.3	9.4	2.2	8.5	19.0	3.7	17.6	14.9	3.6	13.0	19.3	4.3	17.3
1979	32.2	6.8	28.9	10.7	2.3	9.7	21.5	3.9	19.8	15.8	4.3	13.8	21.2	4.7	19.0
1980	32.9	7.1	29.6	11.5	2.5	10.4	22.4	3.9	20.6	16.2	4.6	14.1	21.9	5.0	19.6
1981	33.2	7.8	27.8	12.0	2.7	10.8	22.0	4.0	20.2	16.5	4.8	14.4	22.1	5.3	19.8
1982	32.7	8.4	29.5	12.4	2.7	11.2	21.4	4.0	19.7	16.7	5.0	14.3	22.0	5.6	19.8
1983	31.4	8.6	28.3	12.7	3.0	11.5	20.5	4.3	18.8	16.8	5.2	14.8	21.4	5.8	19.2

Source: Data on 1942 and 1945 are from Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., The United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), p. 415. Data on 1949 through 1970 are from Department of Defense, The Negro in the Armed Forces: A Statistical Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 15 September 1971). Data on 1971 through 1980 were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

N/A Not Available

*Less than 0.05 percent.

^aPercentage computations are based on the total active force as of the month of June for years 1942, 1945, and 1970 through 1975; as of December for years 1964 and 1968; and as of September for years 1976 through 1980.

^bArmy computations for years 1942 and 1945 include Air Force personnel.

qualified black population is willing to serve at today's relative pay level"); and (4) black reenlistments would mirror the first-term reenlistment decisions of Air Force personnel who entered military service between 1963 and 1966.²⁰ In addition, the Commission assumed that just over two-million men would be in the enlisted force of the post-Vietnam military.

As seen in Table 2, the all-volunteer military of 1980 was composed of almost a half-million fewer male enlistees than the Commission had forecasted a decade earlier. Moreover, even with the reduced force, the proportion of black enlistees in all components was underestimated. The difference between the actual and projected proportion of blacks in the Marine Corps was moderately large; in the Navy, the difference was relatively small; and, in the Air Force, it was negligible. But, in the Army, the removal of conscription combined with other factors to create a racial mix of soldiers that had been considered unlikely to occur even under the most "extreme assumptions."

The fact that the Gates Commission was so incorrect in its projection of the racial composition of the Army helped to push the black "representation" issue to the forefront of the continuing debate over all-volunteer recruiting. The gross miscalculation also stimulated many critics of the AVF to examine more closely the full range of potential problems previously dismissed by Commission analysts.

Renewed interest in the "black problem" was stirred as well by similar changes in the Reserves. The Gates Commission "recognized from its first meeting the need for special attention to the problem of the reserve forces."²¹ The focus of apprehension centered mainly on the relationship between Reserve enlistments and the draft. Throughout the Vietnam era the Selected Reserves--used to supplement the active duty forces, help maintain domestic

²⁰President's Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, Report, p. 146.

²¹Ibid., p. 95.

TABLE 2

Racial Composition of the All-Volunteer Force
(Male Enlisted Personnel) During 1980:
Gates Commission Projections vs. Actual Experience^a

Service	White ^b		Black		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<u>Army</u>						
Actual	362,207	67.8	197,446	32.2	612,367	100.0
Projected	671,250	81.2	155,850	18.8	827,100	100.0
<u>Navy</u>						
Actual	380,343	88.7	48,304	11.3	428,647	100.0
Projected	476,050	91.8	42,550	8.2	518,600	100.0
<u>Marine Corps</u>						
Actual	127,343	77.6	36,725	22.4	164,068	100.0
Projected	155,150	84.0	29,650	16.0	184,800	100.0
<u>Air Force</u>						
Actual	340,261	84.1	64,544	15.9	404,805	100.0
Projected	476,200	85.2	82,700	14.8	558,900	100.0
<u>All Services</u>						
Actual	1,262,868	78.5	347,019	21.5	1,609,887	100.0
Projected	1,778,650	85.1	310,750	14.9	2,089,400	100.0

Sources: President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (New York: Collier Books/The Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 146-147. Data on the active force were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

^aThe Gates Commission (President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force) projections were "best estimates" computed in 1969 and based on assumptions that the proportion of black males qualified for military service would rise to 63 percent and that the effect of a first-term military pay increase (40 percent) would be smaller for blacks than for whites. The highest estimate for the proportion of blacks in the All-Volunteer Force (16.0 percent for total Department of Defense) assumed that the effect of a pay increase would be the same for both races. "Actual" percentages were calculated as of September 1980.

^bThe Gates Commission projections of racial composition identify only white and black races. However, data show that the Services actually had the following proportion of "other" races in 1980: Army, 4.1 percent; Navy, 6.6 percent; Marine Corps, 2.4 percent; Air Force, 3.8 percent; and All Services, 4.5 percent. For the purpose of this comparison, however, "other" races are included with whites for data on the actual composition of the male enlisted force during 1980.

peace, and assist in time of civil disaster--were a haven for white young men who wanted to avoid being conscripted. Most people failed to notice the very small proportion of blacks serving in the Selected Reserves, since it was only a minor symptom of the much larger problem of an inequitable draft.

It can be seen in Table 3 that the proportion of blacks in the Selected Reserves increased in parallel fashion with changes in the active force. Unlike the active military, at the end of Fiscal 1983 blacks were still underrepresented in two reserve components, and the upward trend of black participation appeared to have slowed considerably. Yet the changes were, first, not anticipated, and second, in an opposite direction from the perceived "norm."

A closer look at the recent recruiting experiences of the Army reveals that the proportion of black recruits reached a peak of around 37 percent in 1979, almost three times the proportion of blacks in the general youth population.²² In 1980, enlistments

²²According to 1980 data compiled by the Bureau of the Census, approximately 13 percent of the U.S. population (between the ages of 18 and 24 years) is black. It should be pointed out, however, that statistical comparisons between military and civilian populations to determine "representativeness" are not always consistent. Conventional studies of population "representation" in the American Armed Forces use the general population (segmented by race, age, and sex) as the standard or reference population. But, various groups can be used as the national civilian standard for comparison (for example, the civilian labor force or its divisions, the population which served during the draft, the general population of military-age youth, the general population, qualified eligibles, or high school graduates); and various aggregations and combinations of groups from the Armed Forces can be used for proportional measurement from the entire Department of Defense down to the smallest identifiable unit (for instance, total Armed Forces, separate Services, recent accessions, total force, total enlisted force, the officer corps, males only, occupational specialties, broad skill groups, the geographical distribution of personnel according to branch units and echelons, the general distributions of group members by rank within units or subdivisions of units to the smallest level of an infantry platoon or squad). It has even been suggested that standards for comparison be drawn from the conscripted forces of earlier years, though this is not a truly representative configuration of the American

TABLE 3

Blacks as a Percentage of the Selected Reserve Forces,
by Component, 1971-83

Fiscal Year	Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air National Guard	Air Force Reserve	Total Selected Reserves
1971	1.2	2.2	2.0	3.2	1.0	2.8	1.7
1972	2.0	2.9	3.0	7.4	1.4	3.3	2.6
1973	3.2	5.6	3.5	12.6	2.0	4.2	4.2
1974	5.6	7.2	3.4	11.6	2.9	5.6	5.6
1975	7.2	11.1	4.4	14.1	3.8	8.1	7.8
1976	10.6	14.8	5.4	15.4	4.8	9.7	10.5
1977	14.5	19.6	5.9	18.0	5.7	11.8	13.8
1978	16.5	21.6	5.9	19.3	6.4	13.2	15.4
1979	16.9	23.3	6.7	20.1	6.8	14.0	16.0
1980	16.7	23.6	7.1	19.9	7.1	14.3	16.3
1981	16.6	23.9	7.9	19.8	7.3	14.7	16.6
1982	16.7	23.1	8.3	18.7	7.3	14.6	16.5
1983	17.8	22.6	8.3	18.4	7.2	14.5	16.2

Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 1187; Robert L. Goldich, "Military Manpower Policy and the All-Volunteer Force," Issue Brief Number IB77032 (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 3 December 1980); and data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

of blacks dropped somewhat, followed by a sharp decline in each of the three succeeding years. By Fiscal 1983, blacks constituted less than 18 percent of all recruits and about 22 percent of new enlistees in the Army. In fact, in absolute terms, substantially fewer blacks entered the Army during 1982 or 1983 than in any one-year period since the end of conscription, and fewer black males than since the early 1960s.

Recent research emerging from the Defense Department's "Profile of American Youth" study has underscored the importance of the military as an employer of young blacks over the past several years.²³ Statistics on military participation show that at least 20 percent of all black males born between 1957 and 1962 had entered the Armed Forces by September 1983, compared with just 13 percent of white males in the same age group. The contrast appears even sharper when one considers the fact that blacks are two- to three-times more likely to qualify for enlistment. For example, by conservative estimate, over 46 percent of all potentially qualified black males had enlisted by the end of Fiscal 1983. The comparable

people. Another case is often made for using Fiscal 1964 as a "base" year or benchmark for comparison, since it was both pre-AVF and the last peacetime year before the war in Vietnam. Since officers tend to differ markedly from enlisted personnel (as civilian "white collar" workers differ from their "blue collar" counterparts), the common practice of using only the enlisted force in comparisons with the general civilian population is sometimes criticized. For a discussion of the issues and complexities involved in comparisons of military and civilian populations, see Eitelberg, Military Representation, pp. 26-33, 86-98; Coffey and Reeg, "Representational Policy," p. D-20; and Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 205.

²³See Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth: 1980 Nationwide Administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], March 1982).

"participation rate" for potentially qualified white males was less than 16 percent.²⁴

Once in the military, blacks are more inclined than whites to choose it as a career. When allowed, blacks have reenlisted at greater rates than have their white counterparts throughout the recent recorded history of the Armed Forces.²⁵ In the Army, for instance, the reenlistment rates for both first-term and career-level blacks (who were eligible to reenlist) far exceeded the comparable rates for whites each year after the end of conscription (see Table 4). (These statistics are somewhat limited, since eligibility criteria may not affect both white and black populations equally.) In fact, the proportion of blacks among all Army reenlistments doubled between 1972 and 1981, to a point where more than one out of every three was black.

Because the Army requires the greatest manpower and it is generally considered the least glamorous and attractive branch of the Armed Forces, it is also the least socially "representative" Service under all-volunteer recruiting. It is more or less accepted that the Army will never provide a "perfect portrait" of society. But, as long as blacks continue to be so overrepresented, criticisms of the all-volunteer concept (or, for that matter, whatever system of recruitment happens to be in place) will be voiced. And present indications are that the proportion of blacks

²⁴Mark J. Eitelberg, Janice H. Laurence, and Brian K. Waters; with Linda S. Perelman Screening for Service (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations and Logistics], 1984); M. Binkin and M. J. Eitelberg, "Women and Minorities in the All-Volunteer Force," in The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect, William Bowman, Roger Little, and G. Thomas Sicilia, eds. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986).

²⁵See, for example, Department of Defense, "Retention Rates and Composition of the Male Enlisted Force by Race and Year of Entry to Active Service as of 30 June 1973," Manpower Research Note 73-13 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 15 September 1971), pp. 174-229.

TABLE 4

Army Reenlistment Rates, by Race and Career Status,
and the Racial Composition of All Army Reenlistments, 1972-81

Fiscal Year	Army Reenlistment Rates ^a (Percent of Eligibles Who Reenlisted)				Racial Composition of Army Reenlistments	
	First-Term		Career		White	Black
	White	Black	White	Black		
1972	12.6 ^b	20.4 ^b	42.6	61.3	79.8	18.8
1973	35.7 ^b	46.1 ^b	60.9	69.8	78.1	19.9
1974	26.6	43.3	70.4	80.5	77.6	20.9
1975	33.4	54.1	70.3	82.7	74.9	23.5
1976	29.4	42.2	69.1	82.0	71.8	25.9
1977	30.5	48.4	66.3	80.3	70.5	27.7
1978	27.8	47.5	63.4	78.0	68.7	28.7
1979	33.5	53.7	59.6	74.9	63.4	33.4
1980	45.1	65.1	66.3	79.6	60.2	36.1
1981	44.9	66.4	68.0	81.9	57.9	37.5

Source: Derived from data provided by the Department of the Army.

^aReenlistment rates for first-term and career eligible persons (considered qualified and in specified categories for reenlistment) are statistically adjusted to include only those persons scheduled to separate from active duty during the indicated year.

^bReenlistment rates in 1972 and 1973 are for persons who originally entered the Army as volunteers. In 1972, the reenlistment rates for white and black draftees were 11.8 percent and 14.8 percent, respectively. In 1973, 10.6 percent of all eligible first-term white draftees and 12.4 percent of all eligible first-term black draftees reenlisted.

in the Armed Forces, especially the Army, will continue to remain highly overrepresentative as: (1) expanding numbers of blacks qualify for military service; (2) the proportion of the military-age U.S. population who are black increases;²⁶ and (3) the national economic situation, enduring racial prejudice, and other factors combine to make military service an employer of only resort for many minority youths.

3. RACIAL REPRESENTATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980S

The popular media offer some indication of the nature and extent of public concern regarding racial representation in the military. The New York Times, for example, has repeatedly noted the "drift toward a heavily black Army" in its criticisms of the all-volunteer military over the past several years. In May 1978 the Times singled out the "representation" problems of the military in an editorial entitled "Can We Afford a Volunteer Army?":

It is now an Army with substandard education, heavy racial imbalance and a drop-out rate double that of the draft era (40 percent of recruits are discharged before completing their first term of service). . . . Eliminating the Selective Service System has not in fact eliminated the inequities that helped spur agitation against the draft during the Vietnam War. With the sons of the middle classes deferred for college, Vietnam became a poor man's war, with disproportionate numbers of blacks serving in the combat forces. Recruit pay was quadrupled to increase volunteers and, finally, the draft was ended, but the imbalance was only accentuated. There are more poor in the Army now, not less. The percentage of blacks among Army enlisted men

²⁶It is estimated that the proportion of blacks between the ages of 18 and 24 will rise to 14.6 percent by the end of the present decade and continue to increase until 1995 (when over 15 percent of all persons in the age group will be black). See Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population of the United States: 1977 to 2050, Series P-25, No. 704 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1977), pp. 40-60.

in 1971 was 13 percent, about the same as in the nation; it is now double that among Army recruits. Among officers, the proportion of blacks is only 6.3 percent.²⁷

Once again, in 1979, the Times expressed its "Misgivings About the Volunteer Army." "The strength, quality and cost of the volunteer force are all sources of worry," observed the Times; but the "more worrisome" problem is the fact that the "Army is no longer even roughly a cross section of the Nation." Volunteers "are coming far more heavily from the ranks of the poor, the unemployed and the undereducated than did even the troops in Vietnam."²⁸

"The services are growing dramatically unrepresentative of the nation," a widely-read news journal similarly concludes in a cover story on the "military manpower crisis." "A number of military experts argue that while it is true that peacetime service offers to minorities opportunities for educational and social advancement, these advantages fade quickly during a war." And, "the high number of blacks in uniform would inevitably result . . . in a disproportionate number of black fatalities."²⁹

"The disproportionate number of poor, uneducated and blacks" is a "condition that exposes the nation to the charge of turning over its defense to the most disadvantaged elements of society while relieving the middle and upper classes from participation in the dangerous and highly unpleasant business of fighting our wars," a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff argues in the

²⁷"Can We Afford a Volunteer Army?," Editorial, New York Times, 18 May 1978, p. A-22.

²⁸"Misgivings About the Volunteer Army," Editorial, New York Times, 2 January 1979, p. A-14.

²⁹"Who'll Fight for America? (The Manpower Crisis)" Time, 9 June 1980, p. 25.

Washington Post.³⁰ The "ambitious experiment" to maintain a military force composed entirely of volunteers "has not worked well," the editors of Time magazine thus conclude. "The racial balance does not reflect that of the nation. . . ." The draft should therefore be restored, state the editors, since it would provide the Army with "a more representative cross section" of American youth.³¹

In early 1979, a New York Times reporter observed that "many critics, both liberals and conservatives alike, believe that the military has become totally unrepresentative of American society. . . . As they do periodically, these criticisms have led to discussion of reviving the draft."³² A wide range of periodicals, popular news journals, and other publications chronicled the mounting controversy over volunteer recruitment as the nation entered the 1980s. In characteristic fashion, however, the popularization of defense statistics by both apologists and detractors of the all-volunteer military often results in partial statements of recruiting results or, occasionally, in outright errors of fact.

A writer in Science (the respected weekly journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science), for instance,

³⁰Maxwell D. Taylor, "Is the Army Fit to Fight?," Washington Post, 12 May 1981, p. A-12. In a follow-up article Taylor points out that one of two "basic defects" of the AVF is "the low or marginal quality of many recruits and the fact that a disproportionate number of recruits are poor, uneducated or black." (Maxwell D. Taylor, "Volunteer Army: Long Enough," Washington Post, 16 June 1981, p. A-19). See also two replies to Taylor: Clifford L. Alexander, "Now is Not the Time to Draft," Washington Post, 14 May 1981, p. A-21; and Lawrence J. Korb, "Volunteer Army: It Deserves a Fair Chance," Washington Post, 9 June 1981, p. A-17.

³¹"Needed: Money, Ships, Pilots--and the Draft," Time, 23 February 1981, p. 56. In a somewhat different manner, a Washington Post columnist observes: "Defending the United States is just as much the responsibility of Nick and Adam as it is of Jose and Tyrone." (See Mark Shields, "Checkbook Patriotism Won't Do," Washington Post, 6 March 1981, p. A-15.)

³²Bernard Weinraub, "'National Service'--An Old Idea Gets New Life," New York Times, 4 February 1979, p. D-4.

erroneously stated in 1980 that blacks "now constitute about 30 percent of the armed forces."³³ In 1981, Time magazine noted that "the percentage of blacks has risen from 18 percent to 33 percent."³⁴ In commenting on the inequity and undemocratic nature of military membership, a Washington Post columnist observed around the same time that "in Vietnam, American blacks and Latinos, who together constitute one-sixth of our local population, sustained 40 percent of all infantry casualties"; and, "today's all-volunteer army is nearly three times as black as was the 1964 army."³⁵

Many popular treatments of the Vietnam War give the mistaken impression that U.S. casualties were heavily concentrated with racial or ethnic minorities. Actually, during 1965 and 1966 blacks accounted for close to 21 percent of all combat deaths in Vietnam (almost double the percentage of blacks in the Army). Between 1967 and 1972, however, the proportion of black combat deaths averaged around 12 percent. By the end of the war, blacks represented 13.1 percent of all soldiers killed in action³⁶

Furthermore, blacks have never constituted "about 30 percent of the Armed Forces." At the conclusion of Fiscal 1980, almost 20 percent of all service members (and 22 percent of the military's rank-and-file) were black (see Table 1). Over the eight-year

³³Constance Holden, "Doubts Mounting About All-Volunteer Force," Science 209 (September 1980): 1099.

³⁴"Needed: Money, Ships, Pilots--and the Draft," Time, 23 February 1981, p. 56. The Time essay examines observed problems in the four Military Services. The implication here is that the stated increase applies to the military forces in general. No time period is indicated.

³⁵Shields, "Checkbook Patriotism" p. A-15.

³⁶"Information Paper: Blacks in Vietnam Conflict," Department of the Army, DAPE-HRR, 3 March 1977; and Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics, pp. 80-85 ("Casualties"). See also Eli Flyer, "Who Served in Vietnam? Analysis of Factors Associated with Vietnam Duty Among Army First-Term Enlisted Personnel," Manpower Research Note 72-2 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Directorate for Manpower Research, January 1972).

period of the AVF referenced in the Time magazine article, the proportion of blacks increased "from 18 percent to 33 percent," not in the total Armed Forces, but in the enlisted force of the Army. According to the Department of Defense, just under 4 percent of military personnel are Hispanic, and an equal percentage are categorized as "other" racial or ethnic minorities (primarily Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders). In comparison, the 1980 Census of Population shows that 83 percent of the general population is white; blacks comprise almost 12 percent of the population; and the remaining 5 percent are classified as "other" races. Between 6 and 7 percent of the general population, regardless of race, is "Hispanic."³⁷

In December 1980, the General Accounting Office observed in a special report that "the increasing debate about the viability of the All-Volunteer Force has raised many questions concerning the number and distribution of minorities and females in our Armed Forces."³⁸ And: "Because of the increased numbers and proportions of minorities and females in the Armed Forces and the possible impact of these changes on manpower effectiveness, the Congress should be provided more information on this issue. This will enable the Congress to more fully deliberate the issues and reach informed decisions concerning the composition of the Armed Forces and will provide information to the Congress and the public on a regular basis."³⁹

It is interesting to note that, over the past few years, most criticisms of racial representation in the military have been voiced by a relatively small number of academics, commentators, legislators, and writers in the popular press. Americans in

³⁷Special tabulations provided by the Bureau of the Census, June 1981.

³⁸General Accounting Office, Minority and Female Distribution Patterns in the Military Services, FPCD-81-6 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 18 December 1980), p. 1.

³⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

general, according to one survey, do not appear too "concerned" about the overrepresentation of blacks in the Armed Forces. "It may be that some military planners have questions about the current ethnic composition of the Armed Forces," the survey researchers write, "but the general population does not seem to find it a problem. Only about 12 percent say there are 'too many' blacks, and these respondents are outnumbered by the 19 percent who say 'too few' and overwhelmed by the 70 percent answering 'right number'."40 Yet, "American enthusiasm" for a further increase in the proportion of blacks is "definitely less than for increases in the proportion of women and Hispanics."41

Of course, the issue of racial representation in the AVF is more complicated than most popularized accounts suggest. The tendency here is to lay the blame for any perceived problem directly on the instrument or machinery of recruiting rather than on the people or policies involved in its design and operation. In this manner, the overrepresentation of blacks is regarded as an inevitable consequence of the all-volunteer method, which is mistakenly understood to be defective and incapable of ever functioning effectively. At the same time, there is usually an implicit acceptance that "representation" is right and that it can be explained quite simply in terms of statistics and mathematical equations.

Racial participation in the military is affected by the method or system used to procure new recruits, as experience over the past decade has clearly demonstrated. But there are also numerous factors and conditions that promote voluntary service and individual career decisions, and many of these factors have little or no connection with the military or the machinery of recruiting. On the analytical side, too, there is a tangled web

⁴⁰James A. Davis, Jennifer Lauby, and Paul B. Sheatsley, Americans View the Military: Public Opinion in 1982, Report No. 131 (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, April 1983), p. 43.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 44.

of practical and theoretical questions that should ultimately be unraveled and weighed in assessments of "representation."

Race and Equity

The social equity issues that have made military representation important in the volunteer era are essentially the same issues that were used to criticize the Selective Service draft of the 1960s. The only difference is the absence of a war, and thus the absence of statements that the disadvantaged are being employed as "cannon fodder."

The equity issue was used to argue against the AVF at the same time it was being used to promote voluntary service. The basic dissimilarity, however, was that AVF proponents envisioned a higher form of human justice, a freedom for all from totalitarian methods and involuntary servitude. As Senator Robert Taft observed in 1945, the draft "is far more typical of totalitarian nations than of democratic nations. It is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty which have always been considered a part of American democracy. . . . The principle of a compulsory draft is basically wrong."⁴²

It is inherently wrong to force anyone into the military, contended AVF sponsors. Since free choice permits the individual to maximize his or her own utility, several economists added, the volunteer system undercuts any further consideration of equity. And the argument "that a volunteer army would be a black army, so it is a scheme to use Negroes to defend a white America" is "sheer fantasy," Richard Nixon remarked in a 1968 campaign speech.⁴³ The prevalent view that America's volunteers will consist mainly of one or another disadvantaged minority "simply has no basis in

⁴²Cited in Harry A. Marmion, The Case Against a Volunteer Army (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 37.

⁴³Richard M. Nixon, "The All-Volunteer Armed Force" in The Draft, Gerald Leinwand, ed. (New York: Pocket Books, 1970), p. 106.

fact," the Gates Commission later concluded. "The argument that blacks would bear an unfair share of the burden of an all-volunteer force confounds service by free choice with compulsory service."⁴⁴

Critics of the AVF maintained that the volunteer system would be no different from the draft with respect to its effect on minorities and the poor. "The more fortunate are proposing that the less fortunate defend the nation," outspoken critic Harry Marmion claimed.⁴⁵ "Among its other significant disadvantages," he wrote, "an all-volunteer army would give rise, at the enlisted level, to a significantly high proportion of blacks, poor Appalachian whites, and other working-class groups, particularly in combat units."⁴⁶ Just as the draft "economically conscripted" the disadvantaged through its inequitable deferment and induction provisions, the all-volunteer Army was expected to pull from society the less-skilled and less employable youths who were "victimized by the vagaries of the economy."

In fact, the image of the Armed Forces as a place of opportunity, equal acceptance and involvement, regardless of prior social advantage or pre-existing handicaps, has helped to make military service a traditional channel for social mobility. The Services have accepted and even promoted their role as a provider of advantages for the disadvantaged and equal opportunities for all.⁴⁷ According to one study, since 1970 the Army alone has probably put more energy and resources into efforts to improve

⁴⁴President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Report, p. 15

⁴⁵Marmion, The Case, p. 47.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁷See Department of Defense, Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, Report to the President and the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1972).

race relations and equal opportunity than has any other major American institution.⁴⁸

The Armed Forces have long been thought of as offering a "second chance"--a fresh opportunity for education and personal development--to youngsters from lower-class backgrounds who did not have access to appropriate schools, and even to middle-class youths who had access but failed. Since its revolutionary origins, writes Morris Janowitz, the U.S. military forces have provided these "second chances"; and the number of opportunities has increased substantially since the end of World War II.⁴⁹

"Opportunity" is still the predominant message in military recruiting advertisements, and there is evidence that many potential recruits are listening. In 1976-77, a survey of male recruits in all four Military Services showed that, out of twelve possible "life goals," "developing your potential" was seen as more achievable through military service than civilian employment--and it was the second most attractive aspect of enlistment.⁵⁰ In addition, out of twelve possible "military attributes," "opportunity

⁴⁸Peter G. Nordlie, Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial Discrimination in the Army, TP-270 (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1975), p. 1. As Segal and Nordlie also observe, racial inequities still exist in the Army. But there is evidence that the Army has "made great strides in reducing inequalities in promotion rates, at most enlisted ranks, and in most specialties." And "there are indications that the Army has been responsive to social research pointing out its discriminatory patterns." See David R. Segal and Peter G. Nordlie, "Racial Inequality in Army Promotions," Journal of Political and Military Sociology (Draft; no date).

⁴⁹Morris Janowitz, "Basic Education and Youth Socialization in the Armed Forces," Handbook of Military Institutions, Roger W. Little, ed. (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 167-168.

⁵⁰Department of Defense, Results From the 1976-1977 AFEEES Survey of Male Non-Prior Service Accessions (Alexandria, Va.: Defense Manpower Data Center, June 1977), pp. 43-44.

to better myself" was ranked the third most important attribute by all new entrants.⁵¹

In the 1979 Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service, individuals were asked to specify the main reasons why they volunteered. The most popular of all reasons for enlisting--selected by over nine out of ten new recruits--was "better myself in life." Personal betterment was again mentioned more often than any other alternative by blacks (40.1 percent) as the most important reason for joining the military--while most white recruits (34.9 percent) selected "get training for a civilian job." (Almost 34 percent of all white recruits selected "better myself in life" and 26 percent of blacks chose "get training for a civilian job" as the most important reason for enlisting.) About one out of ten blacks and one out of fourteen whites indicated that "get money for college education" was their principal motive for joining--whereas one out of ten whites and one out of fourteen blacks said that they enlisted primarily to "serve my country."⁵²

Historically, minorities have not only sought out the Armed Forces for increased civil rights and entrance into the larger society, but also because it is often the best alternative in a restricted range of economic opportunities.⁵³ As a military sociologist notes, it is actually possible for those who are initially less privileged to compete more realistically for

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²The 1979 DoD Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service was administered to enlistees in all four Military Services, immediately following formal enlistment proceedings, at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES). Data collection took place at all sixty-seven AFEES throughout the nation. The number of respondents to these questions included over 9,000 white recruits and about 3,300 black recruits. The statistics presented here were derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

⁵³See Stephen E. Ambrose, "Blacks in the Army in Two World Wars," in The Military in American Society, Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., eds. (New York: The Free Press/MacMillan Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 177-191.

advantages within the military system than in most civilian education, commercial, and industrial organizations.⁵⁴ Studies have frequently shown that minorities with less than a high school education earn more in the military than in the civilian working world.⁵⁵ Research on veterans and nonveterans also suggests that military service may provide a "bridging environment" (in the form of geographic mobility, occupational training, experience with bureaucratic structures, and personal independence) for the previously disadvantaged: the Armed Forces prepare and certify these individuals for jobs in the civilian economy, thus enabling them in the long term to earn more than their peers who did not serve.⁵⁶

⁵⁴See Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp. 116-117.

⁵⁵See Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural," in National Security and American Society, Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973), pp. 540-541; and Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," Armed Forces and Society 1 (Fall 1974): 120.

⁵⁶Harley L. Browning, Sally C. Lopreato, and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Income and Veteran Status," American Sociological Review 38 (February 1978): 74-85. See also, for example, Sally C. Lopreato and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Differences in Earnings and Earnings Ability Between Black Veterans and Nonveterans in the United States," Social Science Quarterly 57 (March 1977): 750-766; Wayne J. Villemez and John D. Kasarda, "Veteran Status and Socio-economic Attainment," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Spring 1976): 407-420; Michael D. Ornstein, Entry into the American Labor Force (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Melanie Martindale and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Variations in Veteran/Nonveteran Earnings Patterns Among World War II, Korea, and Vietnam War Cohorts," Armed Forces and Society 5 (February 1979): 219-243; and Roger D. Little and J. Eric Fredland, "Veteran Status, Earnings and Race," Armed Forces and Society 5 (February 1979): 244-260. It should be pointed out that research into the economic benefits of military service for veterans is not unanimous on this point. Little and Fredland ("Veteran Status," pp. 244-245), for example, refer to several economic studies undertaken in the late sixties and early seventies that found substantial costs to the individual draftee (usually over the short term).

During the Vietnam War years, many persons were concerned that blacks were shouldering a disproportionate share of the fighting. But, as several observers pointed out, it was the social and economic inequalities of civilian society that helped to push blacks into the military. Whitney M. Young, Jr. claimed in 1967 that the number of blacks and black casualties was high mainly because blacks enlisted voluntarily, reenlisted, and volunteered for hazardous duty.⁵⁷ Moskos, in The American Enlisted Man, attributed the attraction of military service for blacks to the "push-pull" forces of military and civilian life. "Pushing" the young black man into the military was the common plight of blacks in American society. "Pulling" him was the understanding that the Armed Forces were (and still are) a major avenue of career mobility that is generally less segregated than civilian society.⁵⁸

Thus, it is the gap between black and white opportunities in the military and society that helps to make the Armed Forces an attractive alternative for disadvantaged minorities. Moskos writes: "It is a commentary on our nation that many black youths, by seeking to enter and remain in the Armed Forces, are saying that it is even worth the risk of being killed in order to have a chance to learn a trade, to make it in a small way, to get away from a dead-end existence, and to become part of the only institution in this society that seems really to be integrated."⁵⁹

The same general reasons that operate to bring unprecedented numbers of blacks and other minorities into the military likewise function to keep them there. One writer observed in 1968 that the "extraordinary rate of black reenlistment" attests to the

⁵⁷Whitney M. Young, Jr., "When the Negroes in Vietnam Come Home," Harper's, June 1967, p. 66; see also Karl H. Purnell, "The Negro in Vietnam," The Nation, 3 July 1967, pp. 8-10.

⁵⁸Moskos, American Enlisted Man, pp. 116-117.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 133. During the height of the Vietnam War, Purnell ("The Negro in Vietnam," p. 8) similarly wrote that "many blacks agree they get better treatment" in the Army.

fact that the military is, to many blacks, the only way of escaping from the ghetto; and if there are still remnants of discrimination and racism in the military it is also the only major institution in American society that has had a thorough-going integration. . . .⁶⁰ In 1967, Whitney Young similarly concluded that blacks reenlisted in disproportionate numbers "because the Army offers more opportunity for advancement, for learning skills and using natural talents, for dignity, for self-respect and a sense of worth than does the present condition of civilian life." "For the majority of these capable young men," he wrote, "the Army is their university."⁶¹

But these are the general reasons why blacks and other minorities find the military especially appealing. There are, in fact, more fundamental explanations for the changes in participation that have occurred over the past decade. The literature on racial composition, Richard Cooper observes, "reveals a systematic failure to explore the reasons behind the dramatic increase in the proportion of new recruits who are black." Specifically, he continues, "the increasing percentage of blacks in the enlisted ranks can be attributed to three principal factors: (1) a dramatic increase over time in the proportion of blacks found eligible for military service; (2) particularly high unemployment rates that plagued the young black population during the beginnings of the volunteer force; and (3) a lag in earning potential for young blacks in the civilian work force."⁶²

Cooper also attributes rising black participation to the fact that earned income for blacks in the civilian sector has decreased relative to the amount that non-blacks could earn since

⁶⁰Sol Stern, "When the Black G.I. Comes Home From Vietnam," in The Black Soldier: From the American Revolution to Vietnam, Jay David and Elaine Crane, eds. (New York: William Morrow, 1971), pp. 219-220.

⁶¹Young, "Negroes Come Home," p. 66.

⁶²Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 210.

the early 1970s; at the same time, this has not held true for the military (assuming equal promotion potential).⁶³ Another possible reason, he points out, is that blacks may have been more responsive to the AVF pay raise in 1971 than the Gates Commission had originally assumed.⁶⁴ In any case, concludes Cooper, "the increasing number of blacks in the enlisted accession of the 1970s would probably have taken place even in the presence of the draft." And, "some reasonable assumptions regarding the above factors [entry standards, demographic trends, population eligibility trends, economic variables, among others] suggest that black participation in the enlisted forces can be expected to fall between 15 and 22 percent during the 1970s and 1980s. . . . Only under fairly dramatic circumstances, such as a very large increase in black unemployment rates relative to those for whites, would we expect the percentage of blacks to fall outside the above range."⁶⁵

The factors that Cooper identified as being responsible for the sudden increase in participation by blacks have changed somewhat since he conducted his analysis in 1976. The difference between the unemployment rates of white and black youths, for instance, widened considerably from the late 1970s through the economic recession of the 1980s. During the summer of 1983, when the nationwide civilian unemployment rate declined, joblessness

⁶³Ibid., p. 219.

⁶⁴Ibid. Cooper finds that one rationale for this can be found in a logistic supply model, where the pay elasticity reaches a maximum when the percentage of the cohort volunteering is about 0.4 to 0.5. Based on the assumption that blacks have income opportunities equal to about 75 percent of those for whites--along with the fact that a greater fraction of the "prime" black population base (than of the white base) were "true volunteers"--Cooper estimates a pay elasticity (at the draft age) of 1.25 for blacks and 1.00 for whites. (That is, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of military to civilian earnings resulted in a 1.25 percent increase in enlistments for blacks and a parallel increase of 1 percent for whites.)

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 219-220.

among black teenagers soared from 48 percent to 57 percent. Indeed, unemployment among minority youths more than doubled over the past ten years, and it now stands at levels unparalleled in history.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, labor market analysts predict that any future stabilization or decrease of adult employment in this country will probably come to some extent at the expense of young blacks.⁶⁷

The proportion of blacks "qualifying" for military service also increased in the late 1970s, mainly as a result of two factors. First, the percentage of blacks who completed high school continued to rise.⁶⁸ In addition, when the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was developed for Defense-wide use as a single enlistment qualifying exam in 1976, the test was calibrated incorrectly: upper-ability levels were being accurately measured (against the standard population "norm"), but scores at the lower-ability levels were being overstated. The calibration error was not detected until 1978, and it could not be corrected before the last few months of Fiscal 1980.⁶⁹ Consequently, for a period of four years and nine months beginning in January 1976, a considerable number of low-scoring recruits were mistakenly permitted to enlist.

⁶⁶Ford Foundation, Not Working: Unskilled Youth and Displaced Adults (New York: Ford Foundation, August 1982), p. 12.

⁶⁷See "Black Socioeconomic Gains Eroded in 70's," Public Administration Times, 15 August 1983, p. 2.

⁶⁸In 1970, 79.4 percent of whites and 57.4 percent of blacks between the ages of 18 and 34 had completed high school. In 1977, it was estimated that almost 84 percent of whites and 70 percent of blacks in the same age group were high school graduates. See National Center for Education Statistics, Condition of Education: 1979 Edition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).

⁶⁹Department of Defense, Aptitude Testing of Recruits, A Report to the House Committee on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics], July 1980).

In fact, the misnorming episode exercised an enormous impact on recruiting, as the military accepted almost 360,000 male applicants who had aptitude test scores (subsequently recalibrated) below the minimum required for enlistment. The numbers varied by Service, as Table 5 shows, with the Army taking over 200,000 "unqualified" young men, followed by the Air Force (73,538), Navy (45,384), and Marine Corps (38,884).

Basically, about one out of every four male recruits would have been disqualified under the aptitude standards applied by the Armed Forces between 1976 and 1980. Approximately 32 percent of male recruits in both the Army and the Air Force had test scores below the minimum levels established by these Services. About 24 percent of Marine Corps recruits would have been disqualified under the "correct" standards, along with just under 12 percent of recruits in the Navy.

Black young men appear to have been the biggest beneficiaries of the misnorming episode. In all, over 40 percent of black recruits during this period had test scores that ordinarily would have kept them out of the military. Almost 60 percent of black airmen would have been disqualified, along with relatively large proportions of black high school dropouts in each of the Services: ranging from a high of 62 percent in the Army to a low of just under 30 percent in the Navy. It is not possible to look back and conjecture about what might have happened to the otherwise "unqualified" recruits if the misnorming episode had not occurred. In any event, it is clear that the testing errors touched the lives of many people, especially young blacks; and it offered employment, training, and career opportunities to a few hundred-thousand job-seekers who may never have had those opportunities without it.

It has been contended by some that the "main cause" of the expanded participation by blacks was the "vastly larger number of blacks qualifying for military service."⁷⁰ By this argument, the

⁷⁰Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 221.

TABLE 5

Percent of Male Recruits Who Would Have Been Disqualified
from Enlisting Under Correct Entry Standards, by Education,
Racial/Ethnic Group, and Service, 1976-80

Education and Racial/Ethnic Group	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	All Services	
					Percent	Number
<hr/>						
Non-High School Graduate						
White	44.1	17.3	32.0	27.0	34.5	108,051
Black	62.4	29.5	47.6	51.4	43.3	45,780
Hispanic	58.2	27.9	43.7	42.2	50.4	8,907
GED High School Equivalency						
White	27.4 ^a	8.3 ^b	c	d	20.5	3,249
Black	49.0 ^a	21.0 ^b	c	d	45.3	1,645
Hispanic	49.7 ^a	13.6 ^b	c	d	44.2	620
High School Graduate						
White	12.1	7.1	12.0	27.1	14.2	99,546
Black	32.4	22.0	35.6	59.8	34.7	80,023
Hispanic	24.5	15.2	25.5	42.8	25.4	11,582
All Levels						
White	26.5	9.9	18.5	27.0	20.5	210,846
Black	42.2	23.3	38.3	59.6	40.6	127,448
Hispanic	36.8	17.9	30.9	42.8	32.7	21,109
<hr/>						
Total						
Percent	31.9	11.9	23.9	32.1	25.6	---
Number (000)	202	45	39	73	--	359

Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Mark J. Eitelberg et al., Screening for Service (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], September 1984), pp. 137-152.

^aLimited in the following manner by entry standards: In Fiscal 1976, GEDs are included with high school graduates; in Fiscal 1977, GEDs are included with either high school graduates (persons 18 years or older) or nongraduates (persons below 18 years old); and, in November 1977 through March 1979, some GEDs (persons below 18 years old) are included with nongraduates.

^bFor GEDs from September 1979 through September 1980. In January 1976 through March 1979, some GEDs (persons below 18 years old) are included with nongraduates.

^cGEDs included with non-high school graduates.

^dGEDs included with high school graduates.

proportion of young black males estimated to possess aptitudes in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Category I-III range (above the 30th percentile) jumped from 33 percent in 1972 to 42 percent in 1973, while the capabilities of non-black youths remained virtually unchanged. This abrupt increase over a single year was attributed to the changeover by the Army to a new test, the Army Classification Battery, which eliminated the cultural bias that was presumably present in earlier tests. There is no doubt that the aptitude test misnorming of the 1970s played a powerful role in elevating the "qualifying rates" of minorities. However, it should be noted that, in contrast to the estimate that 42 percent of the young black male population in 1973 was in the AFQT Category I-III range, more recent estimates indicate that only 27 percent of the current generation of black males would score in these categories.⁷¹

A combination of varied factors has thus contributed to the changing racial configuration of the volunteer military over the past several years. But, while the overall proportion of minorities in the Armed Forces appears to have stabilized, certain questions of equity remain. One of the more serious issues relates to the fact that blacks still make up a relatively small fraction of officers in all four Services--and, certainly, a percentage that in no way reflects the changes in racial composition which have occurred in the enlisted ranks. As of September 1983, blacks comprised 8.6 percent of all officers in the Army; 3.0 percent in the Navy; 4.3 percent in the Marine Corps; 5.2 percent in the Air Force; and only 5.8 percent in all Services combined.

⁷¹Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth, p. 71. By comparison, it is estimated that approximately 78 percent of white male youths would score in AFQT Categories I-III. It should be noted that AFQT scores are divided into five categories, from I (percentile scores of 93 and above) to V (percentile scores of 9 and below). Scores in Category V disqualify an individual from military service by law. Persons scoring between the 10th and 30th percentiles (Category IV) are considered by the Services to generally require a longer period of training and are less productive on average in jobs calling for a high level of technical skill.

Black underrepresentation in the officer corps is an area of major concern to many people; yet, it generally receives much less attention than black overrepresentation among enlisted personnel. This may reflect the fact that the proportion of blacks in the officer corps has been rising steadily (in the direction of "representation"), and it is expected to continue increasing, however slowly. Conversely, the direction of change for enlisted blacks has usually been increased disparity from the population standard, with no dramatic reversal of direction expected in the near future. The Army also observed in its 1978 report on equal opportunity programs that affirmative action efforts designed to increase the number of minority officers are only beginning to pay dividends. The recruitment of qualified minorities has been difficult, states the Army, due largely to intense civilian competition for minority college graduates and recruiting efforts by competing universities for minorities otherwise qualified to enroll in precommission programs.⁷²

In addition, blacks in both the officer corps and the enlisted force are concentrated in the lower ranks. This is partly due to the fact that promotion is time-dependent, and recent years have seen relatively large increases in the proportion of officers and enlisted personnel who are black. It is partly due also to the lingering remains of racial inequities.

The Services have sought to eliminate the institutional discrimination that exists in most facets of career advancement and promotion opportunities. As Segal and Nordlie observe, trend data do suggest that the Army, for example, has made "great strides in reducing inequalities in promotion rates, at most enlisted ranks, and in most specialties." And, even though statistics "indicate the persistence of differentials in time to make grade

⁷²Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity: Second Annual Assessment of Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, February 1978), pp. iii-iv.

at all enlisted ranks in 1975, these differentials have been diminishing except at the most senior NCO levels."⁷³

Promotion rates tend to vary for different jobs or career fields. Certain military specialties offer faster and more regular promotions. Some occupational classifications for officers do not offer command opportunities or the same career progression possibilities available in other assignments. Because blacks perform relatively poorly on the military's "paper and pencil tests"--and because the mental aptitude testing system is used to match individuals with jobs--blacks have disproportionately served, historically, in the so-called "soft," non-technical skills for which training is minimal and advancement is often slow.⁷⁴

Since the Vietnam War casualty controversy first erupted in the mid-1960s, the Armed Forces have kept close watch over the proportion of blacks in major occupational groups and they have attempted to manage affirmative action goals for a more "representative" distribution. Most efforts have concentrated on reducing the number of blacks who serve in the combat arms specialties--that is, those military jobs which are more likely to "bear the burden" of casualties in wartime. The Army, as seen in Table 6, has been successful in reducing the relative proportion of blacks assigned to infantry and gun crews. At the close of Fiscal 1983, about 30 percent of enlisted men in the Army were black, while blacks accounted for 29 percent of all enlisted men assigned to combat arms occupations. In all Services combined, the proportion of blacks assigned to combat arms (25 percent) still exceeded the

⁷³Segal and Nordlie, "Racial Inequality," p. 10.

⁷⁴In addition to mental testing, other institutional policies and procedures in recruiting, training, and upgrading personnel influence the placement and "utilization" of the military's minority population. An analysis of this problem in the Navy and Marine Corps--and related issues involved in the implementation of effective affirmative action and equal opportunity programs--can be found in Herbert R. Northrup et al., Black and Other Minority Participation in the All-Volunteer Navy and Marine Corps (Philadelphia: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1979).

overall proportion of enlisted men who were black (21 percent) by a slight margin, due principally to the occupational distributions in the Navy and the Marine Corps.

The overrepresentation of blacks in combat arms is a relatively recent phenomenon. Questions regarding the presumed loyalty of blacks and their combat abilities, as well as the needs and operational requirements of segregation, have functioned to bar blacks from the battlefields of this nation's wars. Throughout World War I, blacks were viewed as second-class soldiers and assigned almost exclusively to the Service of the Supplies. By the end of the next World War, blacks still made up fewer than 3 percent of all soldiers assigned to combat arms.⁷⁵ After a long history of recruitment quotas and exclusionary assignment practices, the Armed Forces gradually removed their racial barriers and allowed blacks the "right to fight" in two Asian wars.

The overrepresentation of blacks in the service and support specialties is a trend that can be traced back as far as the American Revolution.⁷⁶ In 1964, the last peacetime year before the war in Vietnam, blacks were greatly overrepresented in the Service and Supply Handler occupational area in all four Services (especially in the Air Force and the Navy). In every succeeding year to present, blacks have remained overrepresented in this occupational area in all four Services. At the same time, black enlisted personnel tend to be concentrated in the Functional Support and Administration categories (see Table 6).

A closer examination of the twenty most common occupational subgroups in the Army provides an even more revealing picture of recent trends in black participation. As of September 1983, over half of all Army enlisted men assigned to the Supply and

⁷⁵H. S. Milton, ed., The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, Report ORO-R-11 (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1955), p. 562.

⁷⁶See, for example, Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).

TABLE 6

Blacks as a Percentage of Male Enlisted Personnel
Assigned to Major Occupational Areas, by Service,
September 1983

Occupational Areas	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	All Services
Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists	28.5	14.4	21.6	15.8	24.7
Electronic Equip- ment Repairers	24.1	6.0	8.7	7.4	10.2
Communications and Intelligence Specialists	28.7	13.0	20.5	16.7	21.3
Medical and Dental Specialists	32.3	16.1	a	19.6	24.1
Other Technical and Allied Specialists	25.3	7.1	18.7	13.9	18.1
Functional Support and Administration	43.2	17.8	24.3	25.0	30.7
Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	27.7	10.3	16.2	13.5	16.3
Craftsmen	26.7	6.8	21.9	17.5	15.6
Service and Supply Handlers	32.6	16.8	28.1	23.5	27.0
Non-Occupational ^b	20.6	16.2	15.8	12.4	16.5
Blacks as a percent of all male enlisted personnel	30.3	12.3	20.3	16.4	20.7

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

^aThe Navy provides the Marine Corps with medical support.

^b"Non-Occupational" area includes patients, prisoners, officer candidates and students, persons serving in undesignated or special occupations, and persons who are not yet occupationally qualified (service members who are in basic or occupational training).

Administration (54 percent) and Wire Communications (53 percent) occupational subgroups were black. Although blacks were almost perfectly "represented" in the Infantry, over 42 percent of all men assigned to Artillery and Gunnery skills (the second most common occupational subgroup) were black. In addition, blacks accounted for over 40 percent of Army enlisted personnel in several other "soft skills": Unit Supply (47 percent), Food Service (45 percent), Administration (40 percent), and Personnel (45 percent). In contrast, less than 14 percent of the Law Enforcement (military police) subgroup was black in Fiscal 1983, and blacks were noticeably underrepresented in Armor and Amphibious (24 percent), Combat Operations Control (23 percent), Combat Engineering (23 percent), Track Vehicle Repair (18 percent), and Aircraft (15 percent).

When the Army's occupational subgroups are again subdivided into primary military occupational specialties, even wider discrepancies are observed. For example, under the Artillery and Gunnery subgroup, blacks comprised 47 percent of all enlisted males in the Cannon Crewman specialty--and between 36 percent and 25 percent of other occupational assignments. In several specialties under the Personnel subgroup, the proportion of blacks exceeded 50 percent. Under Supply Administration, percentages ranged from a high of 61 (Equipment Records and Parts) to a low of 26 (Senior Supply Sergeant). In other subgroups, too, the proportion of blacks within certain occupational specialties was more than double the "expected" rate (or overall proportion of blacks in the enlisted force).⁷⁷

It is interesting to observe that black officers are "over-represented" in the same major occupational areas as are black enlistees: Supply and Procurement, Administration, and Engineering and Maintenance. Black officers tend to be "underrepresented" in

⁷⁷Percentage distributions were derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

the General Officer and Executive categories, Tactical Operations, Intelligence, and the Medical fields.⁷⁸

One immediate consequence of an assignment process that places disproportionate numbers of blacks in certain occupational groups and subgroups--along with relatively higher black reenlistment rates--is the creation of disproportionately black units. Table 7 shows the proportion of black enlisted personnel in selected combat divisions and battalions within the Army and the Marine Corps at the close of Fiscal 1980. (The divisions presented in Table 7 were selected primarily on the basis of their location.) Among all Army divisions located in the United States, the 4th Infantry, stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado (26 percent), and the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (27 percent) had the lowest proportions of blacks. The 5th Infantry Division at Fort Polk, Louisiana and the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia (neither of which is shown in Table 7) had the highest proportions of blacks (41 percent). Within the Army's divisions presented here, the proportions of blacks were generally highest in signal battalions--followed by transportation, artillery, and medical battalions (not shown). In the Marine Corps, blacks were concentrated most heavily in infantry and combat-oriented battalions. Army data also show that the 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning had the highest percentage of blacks in 1980 (52 percent of enlisted personnel)--with blacks representing almost 60 percent of all enlisted personnel in one artillery battalion (and over 66 percent of a battery within this battalion).

⁷⁸At the beginning of this decade, blacks comprised 7.6 percent of officers assigned to Supply, Procurement and Allied Specialties; 7.2 percent of those assigned to Administration; and 5.3 percent of those assigned to Engineering and Maintenance. On the other hand, blacks comprised 1.5 percent of General Officers and Executives; just over 3 percent of Tactical Operations and Intelligence Officers; and 4.8 percent of Medical Officers. (About 5 percent of all officers were black.)

TABLE 7

Blacks as a Percentage of Enlisted Personnel Assigned to
Selected Divisions and Component Battalions in the
Army and the Marine Corps, September 1980

Service and Division	Location	Percent Black	Battalion With Highest Black Content		Battalion With Lowest Black Content	
			Percent Black	Type	Percent Black	Type
<u>Army</u> (Total Black Enlisted Personnel = 32.9 Percent)						
82nd Airborne Division	Ft. Bragg, NC	26.0	38.0	Signal	16.4	Infantry
101st Airborne Division	Ft. Campbell, KY	33.8	49.2	Signal	24.5	Air Asslt.
3rd Armored Division	Europe	34.2	49.4	Signal	25.9	Engineer
2nd Infantry Division	Korea	41.2	57.6	Signal	30.5	Aviation
1st Cavalry Division	Ft. Hood, TX	38.2	54.4	Transp.	29.1	Engineer
<u>Marine Corps</u> (Total Black Enlisted Personnel = 22.4 Percent)						
1st Marine Division	Camp Pendleton, CA	25.4	30.1	Infantry	14.0	Assault
2nd Marine Division	Camp Lejeune, NC	33.0	38.2	Infantry	12.8	Assault
3rd Marine Division	Okinawa	29.6	35.2	Artillery	23.1	Track Veh.

Source: Derived from data provided by the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy (Headquarters, Marine Corps).

Race and Effectiveness

Measurements of military effectiveness are at best imprecise and subject to considerable debate. As Sam Sarkesian observes in Combat Effectiveness, the only "sure measure," after all, is actual performance. But, "we cannot wait for wars" to evaluate the nation's military preparedness: "Some measure of effectiveness, imperfect as it may be, is necessary. A realistic measure of combat effectiveness, therefore, must include a mix of objective and subjective measures, but perhaps more importantly, it must accept intuitive assessments and allow for imponderables."⁷⁹

Effectiveness is directly related to population representation only insofar as such representation provides the strongest and most capable force. This understanding is perhaps best illustrated by the example of perfect population representation. Perfect representation, by definition, implies that the worst as well as the best elements of society be present in the ranks of the military. In practice, this would mean that restrictive standards on mental aptitude, moral background, and physical condition (and any other standards, such as age and gender-related prohibitions) be completely removed to allow everyone an equal right to participate. It would mean that the Armed Forces actively seek and recruit not the most "qualified," but the most "representative" members of society, however defined. The ultimate objective would be a military that mirrored the general population, and any organizational needs would have to conform to this objective (or at least be assigned a lower priority).

Most discussions of the relationship between representation and military needs concentrate on measures of "quality"--or "those aspects and attributes of military personnel that are deemed desirable and that contribute to a more productive, capable, and

⁷⁹Sam C. Sarkesian, "Combat Effectiveness," in Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military, Sam C. Sarkesian, ed. (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1980), p. 11.

better motivated force."⁸⁰ The most common definition of "quality" is that used in Defense Manpower Quality Requirements, a comprehensive report prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee during the first year of the all-volunteer military. As the report notes in its introductory remarks, "the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces depends, to a great extent, on the competence, discipline and motivation of its members. For this reason, a quality force is a priority objective."⁸¹ The report goes on to define the basic elements of quality measurement, including: (1) Physical Condition (determined by medical examination); (2) Moral Background (determined by enlistee statements and/or police record checks on arrests and convictions); (3) Trainability (determined by aptitude tests); and (4) Motivation/Discipline (determined by high school completion and applicant interviews).⁸²

The problem is that there is no convenient, comprehensive, or absolute measure of personnel quality. Adjectives such as "desirable," "capable," "motivated," "productive," "suitable," "useful," "competent," "disciplined," and "adaptable" are all used to describe the perfect military recruit. Because of the difficulty in constructing individual profiles and predictors of performance, military quality objectives are typically expressed in practical terms according to the individual's educational attainment and aptitude test scores. The Department of Defense, in fact, currently uses AFQT percentile scores (reported in the traditional

⁸⁰Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 128.

⁸¹Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Quality Requirements, Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower and Reserve Affairs], January 1974), p. i.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 1-8.

"categories") and high school completion to gauge the quality of new recruits and set annual manpower requirements.⁸³

Education and aptitude have been shown in several studies to correlate well with performance on the job, trainability for occupational assignment, and adaptability to military life.⁸⁴ Non-high school graduates, for example, characteristically experience more disciplinary, administrative, and retraining actions than do those who complete high school, resulting in a much larger rate of early discharge.⁸⁵ Courts-martial and non-judicial punishments occurred among non-high school graduates at rates 1.5 to 3 times more often than among graduates during the late 1960s. And, high school dropouts were found 15 to 20 percent less productive on the job (according to supervisor ratings) than were high school graduates in another, more recent study.⁸⁶

Defense manpower officials report that "a high school graduate has almost an 80 percent probability of completing the first three years of military service as against a 60 percent probability for the non-graduate." Although aptitude tests are "not perfect predictors," it is observed, "they do enhance the probability

⁸³AFQT categories are explained briefly in footnote 71 above. A more recent treatment of manpower "quality" and Service recruiting objectives may be found in Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Quality, Volumes I-III, Report to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], May 1985).

⁸⁴See, for example, Department of the Army, Quality Soldier Study (Ft. Monroe, Va.: Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC] Volunteer Division, 14 May 1975); see also General Accounting Office, Problems Resulting From Management Practices in Recruiting, Training, and Using Non-High School Graduates and Mental Category IV Personnel, FPCD-76-24 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 12 January 1976).

⁸⁵Department of Defense, Quality Requirements, p. 5; see also General Accounting Office, Problems.

⁸⁶Cooper, Military Manpower, pp. 129-130.

that the Services will select the best people from the pool of applicants and will assign them to jobs in which they are likely to succeed."⁸⁷ The Department of Defense "compensates" for the higher loss rates among high school dropouts by requiring that they have higher aptitude test scores to qualify for enlistment.

An applicant who is found unfit (under basic operational standards) for military service can still receive an "enlistment waiver" in certain circumstances and be admitted to active duty. (The categories for enlistment waivers include moral standards, aptitude test scores, physical qualifications, age, dependents, education, alien status, and so on.) During 1980, approximately 13 percent of black recruits, compared with 21 percent of white recruits, required some form of enlistment waiver. About eight out of ten waivers (seven out of ten for black recruits) were granted for primary applicant rejection due to moral unsuitability.

Table 8 displays the percentages of recruits, by race and Service, who required particular types of moral waivers during Fiscal 1983. It should be noted here that the differences in moral waiver rates between the Services, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps, reflect different reporting procedures and, in some cases, entry requirements. For example, based on the statements of applicants, the Navy may require a lower-level administrative waiver under the category of "drug abuse." The Navy reported these lower-level drug abuse waivers; other Services, because of changes in Department of Defense reporting requirements, did not. The Marine Corps, unlike the other Services, required (and reported) enlistment waivers for minor traffic offenses--with over 42 percent of its white recruits and 26 percent of its black recruits receiving special administrative clearances under this category. Nevertheless, it is apparent from an examination of Table 8 that, in instances where there are differences between white and black recruits, proportionately more white recruits required moral waivers of all types in all Services. In the Army

⁸⁷Department of Defense, Aptitude Testing, p. 1.

TABLE 8

Percent of New Recruits Who Received Moral Waivers
by Type of Waiver, Service, and Race, Fiscal 1983

Type of Moral Waiver	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		All Services		
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	Total
Minor Traffic Offense	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.2	42.1	25.8	b	b	5.4	3.0	4.9
Less Than 3 Minor Offenses (Non-Traffic)	0.9	0.3	3.4	2.0	5.4	3.2	0.1	b	1.9	0.9	1.7
More Than 3 Minor Offenses (Non-Traffic)	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.1	b	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.3
Other (Non-Minor Misdemeanor)	6.7	3.1	14.2	7.5	5.8	2.5	1.0	0.4	7.3	3.4	6.6
Adult Felony	b	b	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Juvenile Felony	b	b	0.2	0.1	1.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2
Drug Abuse	b	b	9.8	7.7	5.4	4.1	b	0.0	3.1	1.9	2.9
Alcohol Abuse	b	b	0.4	b	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	b	0.1
TOTAL ^c	8.4	3.8	29.1	17.8	61.3	36.5	1.4	0.5	18.5	9.6	16.9

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

^aInter-Service comparisons should be avoided since differences could reflect different reporting procedures, administrative processes for enlistment, and, in some cases, entry requirements of the individual Services.

^bLess than 0.05 percent.

^cPercentages for types of moral waivers may not add up to column totals as a result of rounding.

and the Marine Corps the proportion of whites who entered with moral waivers is substantially higher than the comparable proportion of blacks.

There are at least two possible interpretations of the data on moral waivers presented in Table 8. One might conclude that blacks who applied for enlistment in 1983 were "better" prospects than their white peers in terms of the military's moral standards. On the other hand, the data may reflect the fact that recruiters and Service officials made a greater effort to get white recruits, possibly at the expense of equal treatment for those blacks who were similarly qualified (or unqualified).

High standards usually indicate that the Services are able to select from among a plentiful supply of available applicants (that is, the military can afford to be "choosy"). Recruiting success thus operates in conjunction with more restrictive enlistment standards. These particular data on enlistment waivers, then, seem to imply that the Armed Forces are digging down somewhat deeper into the supply of otherwise less desirable white applicants than black applicants to meet their recruiting requirements.

All enlistees must also pass through other "gates" or screening devices after they enter military service, because "predictors are, inevitably, not perfect."⁸⁸ For example, new enlistees have to pass recruit training and skill training courses before being assigned to a unit. As members of units, they must reach certain levels of performance and commonly pass written or "hands-on" performance tests before consideration for promotion. Screening procedures are likewise used to limit reenlistment eligibility.⁸⁹

The Department of Defense and the Military Services strive to enlist as many high school graduates and as many high test-scorers as possible--although there is some evidence that more may not always be better. The Defense Manpower Commission, for example, claims "it can be shown that, in certain occupational

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid.

areas, some Category IV personnel perform as well or better than a number of Category I-III personnel."⁹⁰ Indeed, in a study of tank crew members by the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) it was found that the best educated and most intelligent students were the worst gunners.⁹¹

In the early days of all-volunteer recruiting, Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson stated that, in fact, there is an optimal level of low-ability personnel needed in the Armed Forces:

Overall, the learning capacity of new entries is adequate in meeting job requirements when the proportion of Mental Group IV personnel does not exceed about 22 percent. Conversely, when the overall proportion of Mental Group IV personnel falls below 15 percent, there is a tendency toward many people being under-challenged by their job assignments.⁹²

"An extremely capable individual in an unchallenging and unsophisticated job," adds a Department of Defense report on quality requirements, "can create morale and motivational problems. Individuals should be matched as closely as possible to skill requirements in order to serve the best interests of both the individual and the Service."⁹³ Although all jobs "require motivation, maturity, and ability to adjust to a military way of life," there are "a number of jobs in the Service which permit a lower aptitude than others."⁹⁴ It is therefore possible, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird once observed, that "an organization composed of bright people unchallenged by their jobs would be as

⁹⁰Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower, p. 158.

⁹¹See Coffey et al., "The Impact of Socio-Economic Composition," pp. 49-50.

⁹²Elliot L. Richardson, The All-Volunteer Force and the End of the Draft, Special Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1973), p. 13.

⁹³Department of Defense, Quality Requirements, p. 15.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 14.

much of a quality mismatch as an organization made up of people who lack the ability to perform their jobs. . . ." ⁹⁵ The fundamental goal, according to Laird, "should be to obtain people who can perform the required job in a completely adequate fashion."⁹⁶

There are increased costs associated with "both the acceptance of too many personnel who measure low on the enlistment standards and with demanding too many personnel who measure high," another Department of Defense report to Congress points out.⁹⁷ This "cost-effective" line of reasoning still serves as the accepted approach for determining manpower quality requirements. In recent years, research has taken the approach a few steps closer to finding a so-termed "optimal quality mix"--where recruiting, training, and force maintenance costs can be balanced against differing levels of personnel quality and performance.

Studies of the military's racial content--following a precedent set with the first serious examination of racial integration --frequently focus on the differences in "quality" between white and black service members. Historically, blacks have not performed as well as whites on the military's standardized tests. Table 9, for instance, shows the distribution of white and non-white male enlisted entrants by AFQT category over the past three decades (since the end of the Korean War). These historical data reveal that only about 8 to 12 percent of non-white male recruits have usually placed in the "above-average" categories (I and II), compared with approximately 40 percent of white males. In fact,

⁹⁵Melvin R. Laird, Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force: Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1972), p. 23.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 27.

⁹⁷Department of Defense, Implementation of New Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery and Actions to Improve the Enlistment Standards Process, A Report to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], 31 December 1980), p. 3. See also Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, p. 25.

TABLE 9

Percentage Distribution of Male Recruits (All Services)
by Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Category
and Race, Selected Years, 1953-83^a

Year and Race	AFQT Category ^b				Total	Number (thousands)
	I	II	III	IV		
1953						
White	8.6	27.0	35.4	29.0	100.0	668.0
Other races	0.6	4.1	18.7	76.6	100.0	86.5
1958						
White	9.5	28.3	45.8	16.4	100.0	393.9
Other races	0.8	7.1	41.1	51.0	100.0	32.1
1964 ^c						
White	6.8	35.6	47.9	9.7	100.0	371.6
Other races	0.4	7.9	52.6	39.1	100.0	45.3
1966 ^d						
White	7.4	36.9	41.6	14.1	100.0	842.9
Other races	0.6	7.2	38.4	53.8	100.0	90.2
1968						
White	7.2	36.0	38.3	18.5	100.0	713.3
Other races	0.4	6.9	30.8	61.9	100.0	99.5
1973 ^e						
White	3.9	35.8	53.9	6.4	100.0	256.4
Other races	0.4	12.0	65.0	22.6	100.0	68.9
1976						
White	4.1	35.2	52.3	8.4	100.0	292.0
Other races	0.6	13.0	63.4	23.0	100.0	70.7
1978						
White	4.7	32.9	43.7	18.7	100.0	197.2
Other races	0.4	9.0	38.9	51.7	100.0	71.5
1983						
White	4.6	42.1	47.3	6.0	100.0	207.1
Other races	0.7	17.3	60.3	21.7	100.0	56.8
1953 - 72						
White	7.3	32.5	43.1	17.1	100.0	9,720
Other races	0.5	6.5	38.6	54.4	100.0	1,215
1973 - 83 ^f						
White	4.1	34.9	48.5	12.5	100.0	2,633
Other races	0.4	11.1	51.1	37.4	100.0	780.6
1953 - 83						
White	6.6	33.0	44.3	16.1	100.0	12,353
Other races	0.5	8.3	43.5	47.7	100.0	1,996

Source: AFQT category distributions for 1951 through 1973 were derived from data found in Bernard D. Karpinos, Male Chargeable Accessions: Evaluation by Mental Categories (1953-1973), SR-ED-75-18 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, January 1977). All other distributions were derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

^aPercentage distributions for 1953 through 1973 include male enlisted accessions (enlistees and inductees) without prior service who entered the military between January and December of the respective year or years. Percentage distributions for subsequent years cover the fiscal year. Draftees who failed the aptitude tests but who were declared administratively acceptable (on the basis of personal interviews and some additional aptitude testing) are included in AFQT Category IV. Renormed test scores are used for the 1976-80 period.

^bAll applicants for enlistment are tested for their mental aptitude. Test scores are used to classify applicants into one of five so-termed AFQT categories (Category I through V). Those in Categories I and II are above average in aptitude; those in Category III are average; those in Category IV are below average, but still eligible for enlistment; and those in Category V (not shown) are at the very bottom of the scale and not eligible to enter military service.

^c1964 was the last peacetime year before the war in Vietnam.

^dThe greatest influx of new recruits during any one-year period since World War II occurred in 1966.

^e1973 was the first year of the All-Volunteer Force. (The last draft call was issued by the Selective Service System in December 1972.)

the average (median) AFQT score for non-white males (ranging between the 25th and 35th percentile) is about 25 percentile points below the average AFQT score for white males (ranging between the 45th and 55th percentile) in the period since the end of the Korean War.

"Up to the beginning of this century," Leona Tyler observes, "there was scarcely a dissenting voice in the general consensus among persons of European descent that definite mental differences in the various races paralleled their obvious physical differences, and that the white race was unquestionably superior to all the others."⁹⁸ Differences between the tested abilities of white and black Americans are still the subject of considerable controversy in academic, social, and political circles.⁹⁹ The classic "nature-nurture" argument over the relative influence of heredity and environment on measured "intelligence" has stood at the center of the controversy for over one-hundred years.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸Leona E. Tyler, The Psychology of Human Differences, 3rd Ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1965), p. 299. A compendium of research on race differences can be found in Audrey M. Shuey, The Testing of Negro Intelligence, 2nd Ed. (New York: Social Science Press, 1966).

⁹⁹See, among others, N. J. Block and Gerald Dworkin, eds., The IQ Controversy: Critical Readings (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976); Douglas Lee Eckberg, Intelligence and Race (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979); Paul R. Ehrlich and Shirley S. Feldman, The Race Bomb: Skin Color, Prejudice, and Intelligence (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1977); Sandra Scarr, Race, Social Class, and Individual Differences in IQ (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1981); John C. Loehlin et al., Race Differences in Intelligence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1975); Leon J. Kamin, The Science and Politics of IQ (Potomac, Md.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1974); Ashley Montagu, ed., Race and IQ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); James R. Flynn, Race, IQ and Jensen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); and H. J. Eysenck, The IQ Argument: Race, Intelligence and Education (New York: The Library Press, 1971).

¹⁰⁰Early examples (beginning in 1869) of the nature-nurture debate can be found in James J. Jenkins and Donald G. Paterson, Studies in Individual Differences: The Search for Intelligence (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1961). Also, Arthur R.

The subject of race differences in performance on mental tests has consequently become a highly divisive issue, more often a source of heat than of light, among psychologists and other scientists. The heat of the debate is fueled by the uncontested result that "standardized intelligence tests of practically every description show an average white-black difference of very close to one standard deviation, with over 90 percent of the published studies reporting differences between $2/3$ and $1-1/3$ standard deviation, which on the IQ scale (with a standard deviation equal to 15) is between 10 and 20 IQ points, with a mean of 15 points difference."¹⁰¹

The sharp contrast in the average test scores of whites and blacks has been used to justify segregation, racial restrictions, and quotas in the military. Historically, the military's aptitude tests have also served as a convenient device to regulate the enlistment of blacks. The predictability of differences between the races on certain test items and subtests permits the creation of test composites which, with a fair degree of confidence, can

Jensen, Genetics and Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Arthur R. Jensen, Educability and Group Differences (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Robert Cancro, ed., Intelligence: Genetic and Environmental Influences (New York: Crune and Stratton, 1971); Environment, Heredity, and Intelligence, Reprint Series No. 2. (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Educational Review, 1969); James M. Lawler, IQ, Heritability and Racism (New York: International Publishers, 1978). In a balanced treatment of the "nature" and "nurture" positions, Phillip E. Vernon concludes that "both genetic and environmental factors are always involved, and their relative variance cannot, as yet, be quantified." There is no clear verdict in either direction, he adds. (See Intelligence: Heredity and Environment, [San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979], p. 332.)

¹⁰¹Arthur R. Jensen, Bias in Mental Testing (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 98. Although testing research supports the "uncontested result" of race differences, standardized tests and testing situations are widely criticized. Criticisms focus on cultural bias, specific test items, measurement of "intelligence," the failure of tests to measure certain capacities, the use of unsuitable norms, the contamination of test scores by extraneous factors, and other elements.

be used to "favor" one group over another. (Until recently, the Army actually used a different test composite for male and female applicants in determining AFQT scores. The net effect of this practice was a relative reduction in the supply of qualified female applicants--even though it appeared that males and females were being evaluated equally in terms of aptitude standards.) In a less subtle manner, a virtual control over racial composition can be achieved by establishing high test scores as the primary requirement for initial entry and reenlistment (especially under conscription and periods of extensive manpower resources).

In 1950, the Army agreed to abolish its racial quota because it believed that (1) blacks could be "counted on" to score well below whites on mental qualifying examinations and, therefore, (2) the minimum mental aptitude standards could be manipulated, if necessary, to keep the proportion of black enlistments below 10 percent.¹⁰² In 1975 and again in 1979, the Navy was accused by a Congressman of using a disguised racial quota in the form of restrictions on the percentage of recruits who placed in the lowest acceptable category (AFQT Category IV).¹⁰³ In 1980, Congress itself imposed a ceiling on the percentage of AFQT

¹⁰²The Fahy Committee urged the Army to substitute an achievement quota for its racial quota--noting the great difference between black and white soldiers in education and performance on mental aptitude tests. The Army, it was pointed out, could adjust its General Classification Test (GCT) minimum qualification scores up or down and use its physical, psychiatric, and moral standards to effectively regulate the number of black enlistments and reenlistments. See Memorandum to the President from David K. Niles, 7 February 1950, and supporting documents in Morris J. MacGregor, Jr. and Bernard C. Nalty, Blacks in United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents, Volume XI: Fahy Committee (Wilmington, De.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), pp. 1343-1345; and Letter to the President from Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Army, 1 March 1950, in *ibid.*, p. 1350.

¹⁰³George C. Wilson, "Bias in Recruiting Laid to 4 Services," Washington Post, 8 June 1976, p. A-18; Coffey and Reeg, "Representational Policy," pp. 16-18; George C. Wilson, "Navy is Accused of Bias in Entrance Standards," Washington Post, 14 June 1979, p. A-3.

Category IV recruits who were permitted to enter military service.¹⁰⁴ Tests are among the oldest and most effective tools of institutional racial discrimination. And, though limitations on AFQT Category IV recruits may act to raise the overall "quality" of the military, they additionally set upright, according to some observers, a traditional barrier to blacks.¹⁰⁵ The law was obviously not intended to accomplish this purpose; nonetheless, racial partiality exists.

Although black recruits do not perform as well as their white counterparts on the military's aptitude tests, they do surpass whites in formal education. Since 1976, a greater percentage of black recruits than of white recruits in all four Services have entered active duty with at least a high school diploma (see Table 10). This trend takes on added meaning when one considers that the high school completion rate for young blacks still trails the rate for whites nationwide by a considerable margin.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴The standards were first imposed by Congress in the Fiscal 1981 Defense Authorization Act. The standards required that all Services (combined) enlist no more than 25 percent of new recruits during 1981 in AFQT Category IV. In 1982, each Service (separately) was allowed to have no more than 25 percent of its new recruits in AFQT Category IV. And in 1983 and beyond, each Service could have no more than 20 percent of its new recruits in the lowest category. See Public Law (P.L.) 96-342; P.L. 97-86; P.L. 97-252; and P.L. 98-94.

¹⁰⁵See Tom Philpott, "Cat IV Rules Pose Barrier to Blacks," Army Times, 29 September 1980, p. 1. Actually, testing devices and "mental" requirements are old-fashioned tools of discrimination. Literacy tests designed to restrict voting rights and the so-called intelligence tests used to limit American immigration (introduced in 1917) are two of the more glaring examples. There are numerous other examples of "unfair" tests for admission to American institutions; and the modern movement to remove cultural bias from some of these testing devices is a reaction to this understanding.

¹⁰⁶See, for example, Center for Education Statistics, Condition of Education: 1979 Edition, pp. 184-185; and Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth, p. 26.

TABLE 10

Percentage of New Recruits With a High School Diploma,
by Race and Service, 1972-83^a

Fiscal Year	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		All Services	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1972	61.0	63.6	77.8	69.2	46.9	47.0	85.0	80.6	68.1	65.1
1973	62.8	58.7	71.3	66.5	44.0	46.4	84.7	85.8	67.6	63.0
1974	49.3	49.5	68.8	66.8	46.5	45.7	84.9	90.1	61.2	57.3
1975	56.4	60.3	73.4	71.6	54.4	48.2	85.9	90.7	66.3	64.7
1976	55.6	63.6	74.6	80.3	57.8	63.2	88.8	92.0	67.3	68.7
1977	57.2	66.6	72.9	77.5	69.2	75.2	92.0	95.6	70.5	72.2
1978	69.9	78.9	70.8	80.1	68.1	76.4	84.8	91.9	73.6	80.4
1979	60.8	70.6	71.7	84.7	69.6	79.7	82.6	91.0	70.4	76.6
1980	49.4	66.6	72.8	87.2	74.2	85.4	83.2	91.3	66.2	75.2
1981	76.3	90.6	73.7	86.8	77.6	87.3	88.6	94.4	78.8	90.2
1982	87.0	93.6	76.8	87.4	83.2	91.2	94.3	97.4	84.4	92.9
1983	85.5	94.5	90.1	96.2	90.7	95.4	98.4	99.0	90.0	95.6

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

^aRecruits with a high school diploma include persons who attended or graduated from college. Individuals who passed the General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency examination are not included.

Black enlistees, then, tend to raise the overall educational "quality" level of the enlisted force. This is most apparent in the Army and in the Navy, where the proportion of black recruits with a high school diploma has exceeded the comparable proportion of white recruits over the past several years by as much as 15 percentage points. Indeed, in the Army, less than half of all white recruits in 1980--compared with 63 percent of black recruits--had completed high school. At the close of Fiscal 1983 the "quality" gap had narrowed somewhat, but the relative proportion of black high school graduates (95 percent) remained noticeably higher than the proportion of white graduates (86 percent).

There are no generalizations or simple conclusions here for those who wish to equate the two shorthand measures of "quality," educational level and aptitude test scores, with racial issues or the requirements for racial representation. Manpower managers place more importance on education than on test scores as a predictor of an individual's overall performance or "staying power." High school graduation, as noted, is a proven measure--the "best single measure"--of the individual's potential to adapt to military life.¹⁰⁷ Enlistees who perform relatively poorly on aptitude tests, on the other hand, can often be "matched" with less demanding military jobs in which they perform adequately.¹⁰⁸

Attrition is considered among the most problematic aspects of the all-volunteer military, since (1) attrition rose markedly in the mid-1970s, (2) past efforts have often failed to deal sufficiently with the problem, and (3) attrition means that more accessions are needed to sustain force size (with greatly increased

¹⁰⁷Department of Defense, Interim Report of the Study of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics], January 1978), p. 11; see also, Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, p. 30.

¹⁰⁸See I. M. Greenberg, Mental Standards for Enlistment: Performance of Army Personnel Related to AFQT/ASVAB Scores, MGA-0180-WRC-02 (Monterey, Ca.: McFann-Gray Associates, Inc., December 1980).

costs). Table 11 displays the first-term attrition rates of new recruits who entered the military from 1973 through 1978, arranged by race, sex, Service, and high school graduation status. In both education categories (high school graduate and nongraduate), it can be seen that black female enlistees have experienced markedly lower attrition rates than their white counterparts. Black male enlistees in all Services except the Army have higher attrition rates than those of whites. Overall, the attrition rate for white males (32.5 percent) is approximately equal to the rate for black males (33.6 percent). The historical attrition rate for black females is 29 percent, compared with about 39 percent for white females.

It should be recalled that the continuing trend of the past several years has been the enlistment of proportionately more blacks than whites who have attained a high school diploma. At the same time, the difference between the attrition rates of white and black high school graduates has narrowed considerably over the past decade. In effect, the overall proportion of white male enlistees who experience attrition is slightly higher now than the overall proportion of black male enlistees who separate before completing their first term. And this latest trend coincides with the increase in the educational "quality" of black recruits.

More recent data suggest that a smaller proportion of blacks than whites who are released from military service each year do so with an "honorable" discharge--but the differences between members of the two races are generally small. Table 12, for example, shows that the distributions of black and white enlisted personnel who were discharged from the Armed Forces during Fiscal 1983 are reasonably similar in respect to character of service, with certain exceptions in the Navy and Air Force.

A more revealing indicator of performance can be obtained through analysis of separation rates (that is, the percentage of personnel, based on end-strengths, who are discharged from active duty) by cause of separation. Separation rates computed for

TABLE 11
First-Term Attrition Rates For New Recruits
Who Entered the Military From 1973 through 1978, by Sex,
High School Graduation Status, Race, and Service^a

Sex, High School Graduation Status, and Race ^b	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	All Services
<u>Male</u>					
<u>Nongraduate</u>					
White	49.1	51.0	43.9	51.0	48.8
Black	45.1	55.6	48.7	55.8	47.2
<u>Graduate</u>					
White	24.2	24.2	22.6	24.4	24.0
Black	23.8	29.5	32.3	28.0	26.4
<u>Total</u>					
White	35.6	31.6	32.0	27.9	32.5
Black	32.2	36.6	39.2	30.7	33.6
<u>Female</u>					
<u>Nongraduate</u>					
White	59.1	46.1	62.4	50.2	55.5
Black	39.8	40.6	54.6	37.9	40.1
<u>Graduate</u>					
White	40.9	33.8	49.4	31.4	36.9
Black	29.2	28.2	42.8	23.6	28.2
<u>Total</u>					
White	42.9	34.3	50.9	33.1	38.6
Black	30.0	28.6	43.7	24.4	29.0

Source: Derived from data appearing in E. S. Flyer & R. S. Elster, First Term Attrition Among Non-Prior Service Enlisted Personnel: Loss Probabilities Based on Selected Entry Factors, NPS-54-83-007 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983), pp. 22-23.

^aAttrition rate is the percent of personnel who were discharged from the military before completing either three years of service or their first scheduled term of enlistment.

^bWhite category includes persons from all racial groups other than black.

TABLE 12

Percentage Distribution of Enlisted Personnel
Discharged From the Armed Forces, by Character
of Service, Race, and Component, Fiscal 1983^a

Character of Service	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		All Services	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Honorable	78.0	78.8	68.2	62.8	71.4	67.7	76.8	68.3	74.4	74.0
General	11.1	12.5	9.2	12.6	4.6	6.3	14.8	24.2	10.5	13.0
Other than Honorable	4.7	4.5	11.8	13.2	15.6	17.5	0.8	1.6	7.2	7.1
Bad Conduct	0.3	0.4	4.6	4.4	2.7	3.8	0.7	1.3	1.8	1.5
Dishonorable	b	b	b	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	b	0.1
Unknown	5.9	3.9	6.2	6.9	5.6	4.6	6.8	4.3	6.1	4.4
<hr/>										
<u>Total</u>										
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	97,277	39,701	60,612	8,419	30,495	8,645	45,171	7,301	233,555	64,066

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

^aDoes not include persons who were "discharged" for the purpose of immediate reenlistment.

^bLess than 0.05 percent.

Department of Defense enlisted personnel by race and sex are displayed in Table 13. The results show that black men and women both experienced lower total separation rates than did their white peers during Fiscal 1983. Black female enlistees, in fact, typically had much lower separation rates than did white female enlistees for all possible causes. The separation rates of white male enlistees exceeded those of black enlistees in all but three categories (excluding completion of enlistment). The largest difference between the rates of white and black males occurred in the category called "convenience of the government" (primarily early release programs), where the separation rate among whites was almost double the rate experienced by blacks.

In 1971, the Department of Defense examined the disciplinary actions affecting men who entered military service between 1966 and 1968 and concluded that "Negroes are having difficulty with direct authority."¹⁰⁹ A higher percentage of enlisted blacks than whites were also found to have been tried under court-martial or received non-judicial punishment in all four Services.¹¹⁰

In 1980, the Army similarly reported in its Fourth Annual Assessment of Equal Opportunity Programs (as it did in previous "assessments") that "black soldiers and, in some instances, ethnic minority soldiers are indeed in a disproportionate number of adverse [punitive] actions--particularly Article 15s, courts-martial, and punitive discharges."¹¹¹ In the category of "serious crimes" during Fiscal 1978 and 1979, the Army reported that "the

¹⁰⁹Department of Defense, "Analysis of Disciplinary Actions Affecting First-Term Negro and Caucasian Servicemen," Manpower Research Note 71-1 (Washington, D.C.: Directorate of Manpower Research, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower and Reserve Affairs], 1971).

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity: Fourth Annual Assessment of Military Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, May 1980), p. 44.

TABLE 13

Department of Defense Enlisted Separation Rates,
by Cause of Separation, Race, and Gender, Fiscal 1983^a

Cause of Separation ^b	Male		Female		Total	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Completion of Enlistment	73.3	82.3	73.0	69.6	73.3	80.7
Convenience of Government	24.0	12.5	68.6	35.7	27.8	15.3
Disability	3.4	2.3	4.3	1.9	3.5	2.2
Defective Enlistment	4.1	3.0	3.9	3.0	4.1	3.0
Entry Level Performance	11.6	7.5	25.0	10.3	12.7	7.9
Unsatisfactory Performance	9.6	13.7	8.0	7.8	9.4	12.9
Homosexuality	0.9	0.6	3.3	0.7	1.1	0.6
Drug Abuse	3.4	3.8	1.0	1.1	3.2	3.5
Alcohol Abuse	2.7	2.2	1.7	0.6	2.6	2.0
Misconduct	17.0	15.3	5.9	3.3	16.0	13.8
Discharge in Lieu of Court Martial	5.9	6.6	2.5	1.9	5.6	6.0
Court Martial	3.6	2.9	0.3	0.3	3.3	2.6
Retirement	17.0	12.8	2.8	2.1	15.7	11.4
Death	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.4	1.0	0.8
Other Reason	2.2	1.3	3.4	1.1	2.3	1.3
<hr/>						
Total						
Rate/1,000	179.7	167.6	204.4	139.8	181.6	164.0
Number	210,832	57,372	22,723	6,694	233,555	64,066

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

^aSeparation rate is the number of persons discharged per every 1,000 enlistees on active duty during Fiscal 1983 (based on average end-strength).

^bDoes not include persons who were "discharged" for the purpose of immediate reenlistment.

black soldier rate was significantly higher than the rate of founded offenses . . . of white soldiers."¹¹²

Rates for the so-called "founded offenses" (or criminal offenses that have been substantiated by military police investigation) are displayed in Table 14 by type of crime and race. It is interesting to observe that the differences between the crime rates of white and black soldiers remained relatively constant over the 1978-80 period, followed by a noticeable narrowing of the gap in 1981 (especially for drug offenses).

There are still fairly wide disparities between the various crime rates for blacks and those for whites. At the same time, over half of all soldiers in correctional facilities (53.7 percent) and in confinement (51.2 percent) in the early 1980s were black. The percentage of blacks in the Army's prisoner population was about 1.6 times higher than the percentage of blacks in the Army. (By comparison, the proportion of blacks in the Federal Bureau of Prisons was 3.7 times greater than the proportion of blacks in the national population.)¹¹³

It has been suggested that the overrepresentation of blacks in the Army's prison system is indirectly related to other disparities in black representation. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1978 laid blame for the high concentration of blacks in Army penal facilities on inequities in the criminal justice system--specifically, the disproportionately low percentage of black officers (6.1 percent) and the presence of prejudiced white officers from the South.¹¹⁴ Officers make the initial decisions to deal with problems through either minor punishment, court-martial, or early discharge. Administrative discretion thus plays an important part in the initial corrective action, and these decisions have been made mostly by white officers. Moreover,

¹¹²Ibid., p. 47.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 48.

¹¹⁴Bill Drummond, "Army Concerned About Blacks' High Rates of Criminality," Washington Post, 19 November 1978, pp. G-1, G-2.

TABLE 14

Crime Rates of Army Personnel, by Race
and Type of Offense, 1978-81

Fiscal Year and Type of Offense ^a	White		Black	
	Number	Rate/1,000 ^b	Number	Rate/1,000 ^b
<u>1978</u>				
Crimes of Violence ^c	1,548	2.81	2,443	12.74
Crimes Against Property ^d	5,548	10.06	3,385	17.64
Drug Offenses ^e	20,207	36.63	10,448	54.58
<u>1979</u>				
Crimes of Violence	1,461	2.81	2,442	11.74
Crimes Against Property	5,132	9.90	3,936	18.89
Drug Offenses	17,994	34.72	11,784	56.68
<u>1980</u>				
Crimes of Violence	1,475	3.07	2,635	11.76
Crimes Against Property	6,165	12.82	4,943	22.06
Drug Offenses	17,238	35.86	12,101	54.16
<u>1981</u>				
Crimes of Violence	1,427	3.63	2,192	9.91
Crimes Against Property	5,358	13.62	4,369	19.75
Drug Offenses	19,122	48.60	12,226	55.26

Source: Data for 1978 and 1979 are from Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity: Fourth Annual Assessment of Military Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, May 1980), p. 47. Data for 1980 and 1981 were provided by the Department of the Army, Office of Equal Opportunity Programs.

^aIncludes offenses that have been substantiated by a military police investigation but not necessarily by a judicial decision.

^bRate of offense per every 1,000 soldiers on active duty.

^cIncludes murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.

^dIncludes burglary, larceny, auto theft, and housebreaking.

^eIncludes the use, possession, sale, and trafficking of drugs.

the historical underrepresentation of blacks in the officer corps has been accompanied by their pronounced scarcity throughout the entire justice system: in 1978, there was one black (and one female) among the Army's 46 trial court judges; only four percent of the Army's lawyers were black; and only 13 percent of the Army's military police force were black.¹¹⁵

A relatively recent "Study of Racial Factors in the Army's Justice and Discharge System" found that questions of racial discrimination could "not be answered definitively." The researchers concluded, however, that "both the differential behavior of persons of different races and the culturally influenced perceptions and reactions of those who implement the system contribute to the result." Although researchers found no evidence to suggest discrimination per se, they did feel that certain racial differences in crimes and punishments were a result of the way the various races "interacted." But, tinkering with the discharge and justice system, it was also concluded, will not solve the fundamental problems associated with these racial differences.¹¹⁶

Considerations of Unit Performance

There are many theories concerning the consequences of social demography on organizational effectiveness, but very little empirical evidence. Furthermore, there are numerous unquantifiable variables and intangibles, internal and external to the Armed Forces, that complicate any assessment of the manner or degree in which the socioeconomic composition of a force affects performance.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. G-2.

¹¹⁶Don Hirst, "Army Justice System Held Unbiased," Army Times, 13 April 1982, pp. 1, 14, 18; Don Hirst, "Military Justice--Viewpoints Vary," Army Times, 27 April 1981, p. 18.

¹¹⁷See Coffey et al., "Socio-Economic Composition."

The Defense Manpower Commission attempted to determine through an opinion survey of 154 military commanders in 1975 how (according to perceptions by the commanders) certain changes in socioeconomic composition of units may have directly affected the ability of units to perform their missions.¹¹⁸ The Commission found no evidence in the survey results that socioeconomic composition affects the capacity of the military to fulfill its mission. Rather, the Commission concluded, performance is influenced more by "dynamic factors" such as leadership, training, morale and discipline, and materiel readiness than by socioeconomic composition.¹¹⁹

Even without hard evidence on the requirements for population representation, questions of effectiveness are raised. And these questions are often just enough to stimulate public uncertainty and anxiety about the capability of the Armed Forces. For example:

- o To what extent does racial imbalance affect the unity, cohesion, and morale of military units? That is, does social or racial imbalance exacerbate internal tensions and provoke discontent and unrest within the military?
- o Does inter-group diversity reduce or improve field effectiveness?
- o Is a military force composed largely of the poor, disadvantaged, and otherwise disaffected members of society a "reliable" force? Will racial or ethnic minorities, if summoned into

¹¹⁸Survey teams visited military installations throughout the country and spoke with commanders from squadron, battalion and ship levels and above. The ranks of the commanders ranged from captain (0-3) to major general (0-8), and the average time-in-service for the commanders was 19 years. See Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower, p. 157.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 156-157. See also Coffey et al., "Socio-Economic Composition," pp. 36-42, 48-49, 58-68, for a more complete description of the survey and results.

action for civil disturbances, decide they owe a higher fealty to their own community than to the government?

- o Since individuals are responsive to their own reference groups, values, group memberships, ethnic origins, and so on, how necessary is a "balance" of diversified interests? For instance, what effect will an unrepresentative enlisted force have on civil-military relations? Does civilian control exist primarily in the plurality of thought and conflicting interests of various civilian groups in the Armed Forces? Does an unrepresentative military therefore pose a threat to democratic government; and can the omnipresent "military-industrial complex" be controlled? Will military homogeneity act to provide a band of professional killers, mercenaries, or "hired guns" with little stake in civilian society? Will the loss of an identity of thought between the military and society result in a self-serving army of career-minded "employees"--unwilling to pay the price of patriotism in battle?

These concerns have all been expressed at some point either directly preceding or during the operation of the current all-volunteer system; and each, in its own way, is enough to cast some shadow of doubt upon the effectiveness of an unrepresentative military force. Other questions, then, are these: What influence does a loss of public confidence in the military, created by public perceptions of a socially unrepresentative force, have on civil-military relations and military effectiveness? What effect will public doubt or mistrust of the Armed Forces have on recruitment, oversight, budgets, and other areas? Will public awareness of

inequities in military participation fuel disharmony and social protest, as it did during the period of the Vietnam War?

The composition of the military may equally affect the image of American life and American defense capabilities abroad. It has been suggested, for example, that combat units overweighted with minorities and the disadvantaged will not have credibility in the world arena; and a loss of credibility limits military policy options.¹²⁰ On another level, such units may not effectively project (or symbolically represent) the goals of U.S. domestic and foreign policy.¹²¹

It is likely that the overall effectiveness of the American Armed Forces is somehow influenced by factors related to the social composition of their membership. The manner and degree of influence, the important social variables, the point at which representation disparities create effectiveness problems, and related issues are still left mainly to speculation in the literature. The Armed Forces, fortunately, have not reached the degree of divergence from the civilian population where serious effectiveness problems would be apparent (though some critics of the current all-volunteer military may believe otherwise).

4. CURRENTS OF THOUGHT THROUGH AMERICAN HISTORY

The overrepresentation of blacks and other minorities in the American military is clearly a source of concern for some people, primarily mainstream whites. The concern, of course, is hardly new--and neither are the reasons. In fact, the student of American

¹²⁰See, for example, Morris Janowitz, "Blacks in the Military: Are There Too Many?", Focus 3 (June 1975): 3-5.

¹²¹Where military service is perceived as a "burden," a disproportionately large number of minorities or disadvantaged servicemembers is seen to reflect inequities in society and the system of government. "Human rights" and democracy in practice are thus laid open to criticism. The image of the American military and what it represents extends from the highest levels of foreign policy to troop-community relations abroad.

military history can find running currents of thought, from the days of the colonial militia to present, regarding blacks and their place in the Armed Forces.

In 1639, when the colony of Virginia issued the first provision barring blacks from military service, there was a prevalent fear of slave revolts and the possible consequences of training slaves in the use of arms. Free black militiamen, it was believed, might even support the cause of rebellious slaves and turn their weapons on white colonists. The American colonies therefore developed a policy of restricting the participation of blacks in military affairs, "lest our slaves when armed might become our masters."¹²²

During the American Revolution, white supremacists viewed blacks as inherently inferior and untrustworthy. Powerful slaveholders opposed militia recruitment policies for blacks that offered runaways a refuge and other slaves a pathway to eventual freedom. Other colonial leaders considered it morally wrong to ask slaves and former slaves to share in the burdens of defense alongside whites. In response to these pressures and with the support of the Continental Congress, General Washington issued an order in 1775 prohibiting any new enlistments of blacks.

A number of blacks (mostly in the South) joined the British forces against the American colonists, believing that a British victory would bring emancipation. The Continental Congress later allowed free black soldiers to reenlist in an effort to prevent defections by blacks and to deal with a critical shortage of colonial manpower. Several states also defied the wishes of Congress by actively recruiting free blacks to fill their draft quotas. One state, in desperate need of able-bodied fighters, even authorized the formation of an all-black battalion, the members of which were guaranteed freedom and equal pay and benefits.

¹²²Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution, pp. 13-14.

Questions of loyalty were raised covering the service of blacks in the colonial forces. The questions were seemingly within reason. After all, why should slaves or former slaves, treated as they were, defend the very society and government that kept them underfoot? What sort of powerful allegiance would prevent a slave, when armed by his master, from turning around and shooting his master at the very first opportunity?

Doubts about loyalty and patriotism have been pinned on blacks and members of other racial or ethnic groups throughout the history of this country, and some of these views are still held today. The race riots of the 1960s and the emergence of black militancy have helped to preserve and strengthen this public perception in modern times. As the war raged in Vietnam, some black leaders at home spoke of the racist policies of the Selective Service System and the genocidal master plan pitting black soldiers against the people of another colored race. At the same time, as Newark, Detroit, Watts, and the nation's capital witnessed violent unrest, black militants cried "burn, baby, burn" and rumors quickly spread throughout the inner cities that "brothers" were shipping disassembled M-60 machine guns from Saigon in boxes marked "stereo equipment."

Wartime adversaries were said to have preyed upon the supposed embitterment and smoldering hostility of black troops by reminding them of their situation at home and promising them a better life. This strategy worked in the eighteenth century, though never again. It often backfired, infuriating blacks and strengthening their personal resolve. As recently as 1985, the tactic was tried by Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy, who urged black U.S. servicemen to leave the military and establish their own, separate army. "This country [the United States] must be destroyed," Khadafy said in a speech to a Nation of Islam conference. "They [whites] refuse to accept you as American citizens. This means you are obliged to create a separate and independent state. The whites

force you to do this by refusing you in political and social life."¹²³

This particular line of thinking--that blacks are somewhat less patriotic than whites and that a wedge of racial divisiveness can be driven through the nation's fighting force--is understandably reprehensible to many members of the black, as well as white, community. More to the point, suspicions are raised that black troops might be unwilling to carry out their assignments in certain domestic situations, such as a ghetto riot or other civil disturbance. These suspicions were, in fact, supported by an actual incident involving the "Fort Hood 43," a group of black soldiers of the Army's 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, who refused to deploy for riot duty at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968.¹²⁴

Similar fears of divided group loyalties kept the British government from sending Irish regiments into Northern Ireland during the 1970s. It has also influenced Soviet manning policy--seen in the key principle of "extraterritoriality"--where Soviet soldiers are not allowed to serve in their native regions but are stationed in geographically and ethnically different outposts.¹²⁵

¹²³"Khadafy Urges Black Servicemen to Form Separate Army in U.S.," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Associated Press), 26 February 1985, p. 3.

¹²⁴The group included twenty-six Vietnam veterans. According to press accounts, one of the veterans said: "We shouldn't have to go out there and do wrong to our own people. I can't see myself spraying tear gas on my fellow people." And an Army official was quoted as saying, "The problem is so fearful that we won't even discuss these people as Negroes." (Time, 13 September 1968.)

¹²⁵S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces, R-2787/1 (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, March 1982), p. 12. In fact, the Soviet experience is similar to the American experience with blacks. As Wimbush observes in a television documentary: "It is not uncommon to find large percentages of Central Asians, say 75 to 80 percent, in construction battalions where they have received, at the very most, one or two hours of training with a rifle. Many we know about saw their only weapon

When the U.S. took military action in the Dominican Republic in 1965, rebel forces tried to persuade black American soldiers to "turn your guns on your white oppressors and join your Dominican brothers."¹²⁶ They did not. But no matter: what has been in the methods of the Dominican rebels, the North Vietnamese, the Libyan leader, and the Japanese, Germans, and North Koreans before them, has also been in the thoughts and fears of some white Americans. A chairman of the board of the NAACP has characterized the loyalty issue as a "smokescreen thrown up by more subtle, sophisticated racists."¹²⁷ Racist or not, the running current of mistrust has survived two centuries of wartime tests and life in America's melting pot, and it lives on today.

Although blacks were barred from bearing arms in the armies of colonial America, regulations often required free blacks to serve as drummers, fifers, laborers, and assorted auxiliary workers. (An estimated 5,000 blacks, including those with the Continental Navy, the state navies, and privateers, nonetheless fought with the colonial forces.) Blacks accounted for about 9 to 10 percent of the Union Army (and one-quarter of enlistments in the Navy) during the Civil War, suffering a mortality rate

or handled their own weapon when they took their military oath, and some of them have informed us that, in fact, the weapon was made of wood. What it amounts to is a systematic policy of segregating minorities--Central Asians, Caucasians, Balts, and Western Ukrainians primarily--from positions of military responsibility and especially from high-technology positions." A former Soviet lieutenant expands on this theme: "Most European Russian soldiers dislike the Asians, calling them by insulting names like 'animals.' The Asians are subordinate and badly educated, spending most of their time either asleep or getting first in line for dinner. The senior officers don't like them because they're lazy. So they put them in construction units, who are almost all Asians, doing hard labor with pick and shovel." (Quotations are from "The Red Army," World No. 404, Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) WGBH, May 6, 1981.)

¹²⁶Moskos, The American Enlisted Man, p. 130.

¹²⁷"All-Vol Critics Accused of Racism," Army Times, 1 August 1980.

almost 40 percent higher than that of white troops. By the outbreak of World War I, blacks were back serving in menial occupations--supply, stevedore, engineer, and labor crews--within peripheral units. About 200,000 black soldiers served in France during World War I, and about eight out of ten were assigned as laborers in the Service of Supplies. The Navy enlisted around 10,000 blacks during the war, assigning most as messmen, stewards, or coal passers in the firerooms.

At the close of World War II, blacks comprised less than three percent of all men assigned to combat arms in the Army, while almost four out of five were relegated to the service branches. Until 1944, all of the Navy's 165,000 blacks were assigned to the stewards' branch (where blacks were nicknamed "cooks and bellhops at sea"). Prior to World War II, the Marine Corps was able to avoid the racial assignment issue entirely by accepting only white volunteers. Eventually, the manpower demands of the war effort led to the required induction of blacks in the Navy and Marine Corps; but difficulties in creating separate facilities and segregated units limited both the number of blacks and nature of available jobs in these Services.

Forty years following the end of World War I--two-hundred-plus years after the Peace of Paris--blacks can still be found filling the ranks of functional support, supply, and service-oriented jobs in numbers disproportionate to their representation in the military. And all indicators suggest that this is a trend destined to endure.

The exigencies of war have pried open the doors of American military service to blacks. During the Revolutionary War, the colonies were more or less compelled to put blacks in the fighting. Colonists in the North who were drafted to meet state levies also used slaves as "substitutes," a practice that quickly became popular. Only in the lower South did the continuing fear of slave revolts prevail over the urgent needs of the war and sustain provisions barring the enlistment of blacks.

During the early days of the Civil War, blacks were purposely excluded from service in the Union Army by the Lincoln Administration to maintain the loyalty of border states and to focus the cause of the struggle on the preservation of the Union rather than on the abolition of slavery. Even so, some black regiments were formed by Union generals without authorization as soon as white volunteers became scarce. The Emancipation Proclamation formally provided for the enlistment of blacks, and active recruiting efforts quickly followed its issuance in 1863. The nation's first draft law was passed within the next two months, and the states began to assemble volunteer black units whose enlistees could then be counted in the states' draft quotas. President Lincoln later admitted that the participation of blacks in the Civil War had been crucial, ensuring a Northern victory and preservation of the Union.¹²⁸

In the early days of World War II, blacks were viewed as manpower problems rather than assets. Segregation was a part of the American way, and the military establishment believed that any other arrangement would undermine unit efficiency and create racial friction. Special treatment for blacks was thus required: all-black units had to be carefully situated so that objections from surrounding communities were minimal; special training staffs and separate facilities, including black-only blood banks, were considered essential; existing policies called for separate assignment, classification, and replacement processes to segregate units and distribute blacks to different branches; and special procedures were needed for identifying men by race to limit the number of black draftees.

In December 1944, shortages of infantry riflemen replacements in the European theater pushed the Army to convert physically qualified men from the communication zone's all-black units into combat troops. The original plan, later changed, promised blacks

¹²⁸Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 48.

that they would be assigned "without regard to color or race to the units where assistance is most needed, and give you the opportunity of fighting shoulder to shoulder to bring about victory."¹²⁹

The Army sent about 2,800 black troops, hurriedly retrained as infantrymen, to fight beside white troops in France, Belgium, and Germany. As the Battle of the Bulge intensified, all-black platoons were combined with white platoons and put into action as elements of eleven divisions of the U.S. First and Seventh armies. Historian Ulysses Lee would later write in the Army's official account of the war that "the Army found that it was the 10 percent of American manpower which was Negro that spelled a large part of the difference between the full and wasteful employment of available American manpower of military age."¹³⁰

In 1948, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which "declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin," and that promotions were to be based "solely on merit and fitness."¹³¹ Two years later, the Army became the last

¹²⁹The original letter was later modified because it was felt that the plan to use black troops constituted an unnecessarily radical break with traditional Army policy and existing regulations; further, it might prove embarrassing to the War Department. A revised letter was therefore prepared, changing all but the first two sentences of the original and no longer promising "the opportunity of fighting shoulder to shoulder." A cover memorandum also ordered the return and destruction of all copies of the original version--but by the time the revised letter and new orders were released, the first letter had already been distributed to most of the units. Ulysses G. Lee, The United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), pp. 689-691.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 703-704.

¹³¹Executive Order 9981, Federal Register, Vol. 13, 28 July 1948, p. 4313. See also Freedom to Serve: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Report by the President's

Service to officially submit a plan for unrestricted "equality of treatment and opportunity."

Despite the desegregation order and blueprint for a color-blind policy, the outbreak of the Korean War found a still-segregated Army--but this time with the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment committed to combat duty. Blacks were joining the Army in large numbers, and by the middle of 1951 one out of every four new recruits was black.¹³² Black training units in the United States and service units in Korea could no longer absorb the rapidly increasing number of black enlistees. The Army, too, was faced with a shortage of men in white units, especially those on the front lines in Korea. Military necessity eventually prevailed over procedure and forced integration of both training units and combat units. Soon, all Army basic training centers were integrated and blacks were being assigned freely to combat units. By the end of the war, it was said that "young Negro recruits serving in Korea found it hard to believe that an all-Negro regiment had ever existed."¹³³

In contrast to the two World Wars and the early days of Korea when blacks had to "fight for the right to fight," the Vietnam War brought charges that blacks were doing more than their fair share of the fighting. Indeed, it was said that blacks and other disadvantaged youths were being sent to Southeast Asia as "substitutes" for the draft-deferred sons of the privileged classes; that "special efforts" and methods actually favored the recruitment of blacks over whites; that the "better off" were also the better-protected, insulated from the draft through "channeling" policies and a wide array of income-based devices, while blacks were being systemically marched off to battle.

Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950).

¹³²Milton, Utilization of Negro Manpower, p. 569.

¹³³Ulysses G. Lee, "The Draft and the Negro," Current History 55 (July 1968): 33.

In fact, between 1961 and 1966, when blacks comprised about 11 percent of the general population aged 19 to 21, black casualties amounted to almost one-fourth of all losses of Army enlisted personnel in Vietnam (a situation that was, however, later corrected). To the black community, perhaps the most distressing aspect of Selective Service inequities was that the Armed Forces were apparently sending the "best" young men--those who were educated and healthy but not deferred--to fight in Vietnam. The majority of blacks who applied to the military (conscripts or volunteers) were rejected because of inadequate education or poor health. Those who were being accepted, according to Whitney Young, were the "cream of the crop" from the black neighborhoods--the "potential forces of leadership. . . in the battle cry for freedom at home."¹³⁴ They were the young, virile, income-producing males, the "shining lights of tomorrow" who were leaving a leadership vacuum in the black community that could not be easily filled.¹³⁵

While the exigencies of war have helped to bring racial equity to the military, the participation of blacks in combat has probably helped to bring improved civil rights to the larger society. In colonial America, slaves who demonstrated their courage under fire were sometimes promised freedom--while free blacks held the hope of elevating their low social status. Militia recruitment policies were thus seen to offer runaways a refuge and other slaves a pathway out of bondage. Similarly, during World War I, many blacks pegged their hopes for a better future on involvement in the war and many black leaders hoped to use the Army as a vehicle for social change. W.E.B. Dubois, for instance, believed in 1917 that "if the black man could fight to defeat the

¹³⁴Whitney M. Young, Jr., "When the Negroes Come Home," p. 66.

¹³⁵Robert D. Tollison, "Racial Balance and the Volunteer Army," in Why the Draft?, James C. Miller III, ed. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1968), p. 149; and Marmion, The Case, p. 34.

Kaiser . . . he could later present a bill for payment due to a grateful white America."¹³⁶

"A grateful white America" was nowhere to be found at the close of the First World War, nor at the final return of troops from Korea or Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, there could be no question of the fact that blacks carried their fair share of the load--that blacks paid the "price in blood" for entrance into the mainstream, the price of full citizenship. On television sets across the country, every middle American could witness in living color the battlefield bravery of young men, white and black together. And, all too often, the faces of the soldiers television viewers saw were those of black youngsters pressed into service by the powerful hand of their own poverty. So it follows, as one writer observed during the height of the war, this demonstration of patriotism and courage by black soldiers had become an agent of equal opportunity and civil rights: "History may record that the single most important psychological event in race relations in the 1960s was the appearance of Negro fighting men on the TV screens of America. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is one of the oldest known routes to social equality."¹³⁷

¹³⁶Ambrose, "Blacks in Two World Wars," pp. 178-179.

¹³⁷Daniel P. Moynihan, "Who Gets in the Army?," New Republic, 5 November 1966, p. 22. In fact, the absorption of immigrants into the American melting pot has been achieved historically through the "blood test"--you proved you loved America through allegiance and sacrifice and dying for the country in its wars. As Michael Novak observes in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in the Seventies (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. xxi-xxii, when the Poles were only about 4 percent of the U.S. population in 1917-19, they accounted for over 12 percent of the nation's casualties in World War I. The "fighting Irish" did not win that epithet on the playing fields of Notre Dame but by dying in droves during the American Civil War. Victor Hicken points out in The American Fighting Man (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 365, that the sansei, because of Pearl Harbor and subsequent discrimination, felt compelled to prove their loyalty to America on the battlefield "with a vengeance." Thus, according to Morris Janowitz, "from World War I onward, citizen military service has been seen as a device by which excluded segments of

Historically, social and economic depression has had an unyielding grasp on blacks in this country. This is one important reason why blacks have always found a special appeal in military membership--offering a steady job and income, improved living conditions, training, education, employment experience, and the status that accompanies honorable service to the nation. It is estimated that during the Civil War, over 200,000 black soldiers and freedmen were educated in the Army's schools, while former slaves were "the most numerous and earnest pursuers of learning."¹³⁸ After the Civil War, a Congressional authorization created six black regiments in the regular Army (later reduced to two infantry and two cavalry regiments). These units, led by white officers, fought Indians and filled outposts in the West--and they seldom, if ever, had vacancies.

It can probably be said that there has never since been a shortage of black manpower: the "supply" available for military service has invariably exceeded the prescribed "demand." Even during the days of World War II, when the country experienced its most massive mobilization, blacks were barred from volunteering. Prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Army permitted enlistments by blacks only to fill vacancies in existing black units that were also held understrength. After the outbreak of the War, as a Selective Service report notes, "there was no welcome for Negroes." "It was announced officially that there was 'no room in the Army for more Negroes at present.' This action was difficult to understand since the Nation was then engaged in a conflict which threatened its existence."¹³⁹ (The Navy allowed limited enlistments of blacks in the messmen's branch. The Marine

society could achieve political legitimacy and rights"(from "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," Armed Forces and Society 2 [Winter 1976]: 192).

¹³⁸Historian F. I. Wiley cited in Foner, Blacks and the Military, p 40.

¹³⁹Selective Service System, Special Groups, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 26.

Corps did not accept blacks in any capacity.) "Who has a better right to volunteer in a fight for freedom and democracy than the colored men of America?," Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York and others asked. Nonetheless, severe restrictions against the enlistment of blacks in the Army survived the entire Second World War.¹⁴⁰

Now, in the days of all-volunteer recruitment, blacks are still strongly drawn to service in the nation's military forces. It should come as no surprise: blacks continue to stand far beneath whites on America's socioeconomic ladder. This fact is especially evident in the jobless rate of teenaged black males, which has hovered at around 40 or 50 percent for several years--more than twice the level experienced by white teenagers. At the same time, unemployment among minority youths has more than doubled over the past ten years--and, even though the average level of education for young blacks has increased, proportionately more black high school graduates than white high school dropouts were jobless and looking for work in the early 1980s.¹⁴¹

Surveys continue to show that blacks join the military for "a chance to better myself in life" and for the many opportunities which cannot be obtained as easily in the civilian community. Still, the common factor that influences the overall attractiveness of the military, particularly for young black males, is the dismal civilian labor market that confronts them. They are, as noted above, much more likely to be unemployed and, when employed, more likely to earn less than their white contemporaries.

The degree to which military recruitment patterns can be attributed to changes in the labor market is a contentious issue--but recent research has revealed important differences by race, differences that raise the specter of a recruiting practice popular long ago. Analysts who have attempted to distinguish between the enlistment response of white and minority youths to

¹⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 26-27.

¹⁴¹Ford Foundation, Not Working, p. 18.

variations in unemployment, it seems, have consistently measured a significantly smaller response from blacks; and, in some cases, the changes in enlistment rates have been in an opposite direction from the shifting rates of unemployment. For example, while a 10 percent increase in white youth unemployment is found to result in a 5 percent increase in high-quality white volunteers, a similar increase in black youth unemployment would be expected to yield a 6 percent decrease in black volunteers with similar qualitative characteristics.¹⁴²

The different enlistment response of whites and blacks to shifts in unemployment is probably a manifestation of what has been called the "substitution effect": during periods of rising unemployment, when the Services are able to attract more high school graduates who have scores in the higher aptitude categories, they are typically less inclined to accept volunteers with lower levels of education or lower aptitude test scores. Applicants with higher qualitative profiles--gauged mainly by education and performance on a paper-and-pencil test measuring verbal and quantitative skills--are thus preferred over those who are lower on the scale. The fact that white youths are more likely to be in the former group and blacks in the latter means that white youths, on the average, will be more "preferred" than black youths during the better recruiting times; and, conversely, blacks may be "substituted" for whites when service in the military becomes generally less desirable.

The use of blacks as "substitutes" for whites, the poor as "substitutes" for the more affluent, and vice versa, is an established practice at least as old as the American military itself. Indeed, history shows that this nation has denied members of certain social categories entrance into military service when it was important to them to serve and has protected members of other groups when it was important to them not to serve. From the days of the American Revolution and the Civil War, when draftees could

¹⁴²See Binkin and Eitelberg, "Women and Minorities," p. 77.

pick their own "substitutes," to the days of the Vietnam War, when the machinery of conscription busily "channeled" its take, power and economic privilege have played an important part in military manning methods. Even today, it could be said that white young men are the main beneficiaries--indirectly and at the expense of blacks--of Service screening policies that place a premium on education and aptitude test performance.

Another running current of thought relates to the continuing perception by some that an improper balance or mixing of the races in military units will impair personnel performance and overall effectiveness. When racial segregation was the accepted social practice, it was deemed appropriate for the military as well--and the Armed Forces went to great lengths to prevent the intermingling of black and white troops.

In the early days of the Civil War, military leaders in the Union Army pressured President Lincoln to bar blacks from enlisting, fearing that the presence of black soldiers would cause disharmony and drive away white volunteers. During the two World Wars, it was likewise felt that integration of any sort would harm unit efficiency, give rise to racial tensions, and arouse the ingrained racist spirits of white soldiers. During World War II, the Navy went so far as to commission two ships with all-black enlisted crews--a destroyer-escort and a subchaser--in an experiment testing the capabilities of blacks to perform in jobs other than messman.¹⁴³ (The "lily-white Navy" was not so-named solely because of its well-laundered uniforms.) Some Defense planners, recognizing both the need for segregation and the requirement for added black manpower, at one point seriously considered setting

¹⁴³The USS Mason (DE-529) was designated as the destroyer-escort and the USS PC 1264 was named the subchaser in this experiment. See Eric Purdon, Black Company: The Story of Subchaser 1264 (New York: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1972).

up a special basic training post for black recruits--as far away as possible from the racial animosity of whites--in Antarctica.¹⁴⁴

In 1950, the Army's Board to Study the Utilization of Negro Manpower reported that widespread integration, however desirable as a social measure, and abolition of the 10-percent ceiling on black soldiers would markedly reduce combat efficiency and unit morale. The Army further contended that its racial policies were not dictated by racial prejudice, but by two conditions: most whites do not associate with blacks, and blacks, through no fault of their own, do not have the skills or education required for many of the Army's occupational specialties.¹⁴⁵

Several years earlier, the Navy had refused to integrate its ships for many of the same reasons. The Navy's General Board, in a written report, stated that discrimination "is but part and parcel of similar discrimination throughout the United States, not only against the Negro, but in the Pacific States and in Hawaii against citizens of Asiatic descent." The reasons for this, the report continued, "are rather generally that: (a) the white man will not accept the Negro in a position of authority over him; (b) the white man considers that he is of a superior race and will not admit the Negro as an equal; and (c) the white man refuses to admit the Negro to intimate family relationships leading to marriage."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴Richard J. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 5.

¹⁴⁵From the report of the Chamberlin Board (Board to Study the Utilization of Negro Manpower), examined in Milton, Utilization of Negro Manpower, pp. 579-581. Also reviewed are other supporting studies by the Army in the early 1950s on the limited use of black troops--including officer surveys and reports, Army student reports, Army committee studies, and attitude surveys of black and white soldiers. The Board later concluded that integrated combat units performed better than segregated ones, but that it was necessary to reimpose the quota and to retain some separate black units.

¹⁴⁶Purdon, Black Company, pp. 17-18.

The Korean War coincided with the desegregation of the Armed Forces, and it afforded an unusual opportunity to test the effectiveness of integration on a large scale. The most notable research undertaking of the period, "Project Clear," concluded in 1951 that "racial segregation limits the effectiveness of the Army," while "integration enhances the effectiveness of the Army."¹⁴⁷ The Korean War consequently put to rest, at least on the surface, not only doubts about the individual effectiveness of black soldiers, but also fears that integration would have adverse consequences for group solidarity and hence unit performance.

During the Vietnam War, it was said that some company commanders practiced "discrimination-in-reverse" so that combat platoons would contain a proportional balance of the races. However, these actions were taken not for racial harmony, but for the purpose of keeping black casualty counts down to a more "representative" level and distributing combat burdens more equitably.

Now, under the all-volunteer system, some public officials can be heard calling for a "balanced mix" of blacks and whites in the Armed Forces, once again premised on the grounds of unit effectiveness and improved racial relations. Sociologists in the 1970s also spoke of the inherent racism of the American people, the possibility of "white flight" from the military, and the prospect that a "tipping point" (where disproportionately high black membership drives away white volunteers) could be reached, causing "a significant diminishment of white recruits for the ground force units involved."¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the Army Secretary

¹⁴⁷See Milton, Utilization of Negro Manpower; and Leo Bogart, ed., Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army: Two Original 1951 Field Reports (New York: Markham, 1969).

¹⁴⁸See, for example, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Symposium: Race in the United States Military," Armed Forces and Society 6 (Summer 1980): 593. The "white flight" comment is from testimony by Rep. Robin L. Beard, in Status of the All-Volunteer Force, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C: Govern-

himself acknowledged in 1977 that his Service had to virtually rebuild its corps of noncommissioned officers "who were hostile to the increased number of blacks."¹⁴⁹ And others have observed a recent deterioration of race relations and a rising tide of racial bigotry aimed at blacks in uniform.¹⁵⁰

World War I, it has been found, also brought three important legacies that continue to influence opinions about blacks and the military.¹⁵¹ First, in response to the highly publicized failures of certain all-black fighting units in France, such as the 368th Regiment of the 92nd "Buffalo" Division, came the view that blacks generally do not perform well in combat.

Disagreement about the fighting abilities of blacks arose again during the Second World War. In February 1945, a task force of the 92nd "Buffalo" Division was pulled out of action against the German Gothic-Line in Italy after three days of excessive "straggling" and "disorganization." Reports from the field did not mention the many acts of individual and group bravery, but instead spoke generally of panic-stricken infantrymen who would "melt away" in the heat of battle.¹⁵² Subsequent evaluations of the performance of black troops in the War pointed out that the units were poorly prepared and trained; and that the

ment Printing Office, 1978), p.69.

¹⁴⁹New York Times, 11 January 1977, cited in Binkin and Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military, p. 106.

¹⁵⁰Tom Philpott, "EO Programs Downgrading Found," Army Times, 23 March 1981, p. 1, 23; and Lothar H. Wedekind, "GIs in the Klan: A Look Under Their Hoods," Army Times Magazine, 7 July 1980, p. 5.

¹⁵¹Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology (University Park, Md.: The Social Science Press, 1965), pp. 342-343. See also Eli Ginzberg, The Negro Potential (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 62-64.

¹⁵²Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 16; and Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, p. 576.

conditions of second- or third- or fourth-class citizens did not contribute to the development of first-class soldiers.¹⁵³

Most assessments of the performance of black troops at this time skirted the question of the quality of their leaders, most of whom were white. But there is ample evidence to suggest that at least some of the blame for the poor showing of black units should rest on inferior leadership. Black units "often became, as they had in earlier wars, dumping grounds for officers unwanted in white units."¹⁵⁴ Moreover, many white officers resented being assigned to a black unit, seeing it as a stigma and slow road to nowhere. The Army often aggravated the situation "by showing a preference for officers of southern birth and training," who were particularly resented by the black troops.¹⁵⁵

In the first days of the Korean War, reports circulated about the unreliability of black soldiers, who allegedly would "melt into the night" only to turn up the next day insisting they had been lost.¹⁵⁶ By war's end, with more than 90 percent of all blacks in the Army assigned to integrated units, there was little purpose in questioning the fighting abilities of blacks. After each war, one commentator observed in 1947, it was always necessary to again ask, "Do Negroes make good soldiers?"¹⁵⁷ After Korea, when there was no longer a need to justify racial segregation, it was no longer appropriate to single out blacks for special study.

¹⁵³Eli Ginzberg et al., The Ineffective Soldier: Lessons for Management and the Nation, Volume I: The Lost Divisions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 124-125; and Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 704-705.

¹⁵⁴Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1981), p. 37.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front, p. 20.

¹⁵⁷Jean Byer, The Study of the Negro in Military Service (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 1947). (Processed.)

In the modern era, questions are instead asked about the soldierly abilities of persons with lower aptitude test scores or less formal education. As pointed out, "there is historical evidence to support the views of most military professionals that increasing the number of better-educated, more intelligent soldiers would improve combat effectiveness. Studies of combat soldiers in World War II and the Korean War showed that soldiers with higher education and mental scores were rated as better fighters by peers and immediate supervisors."¹⁵⁸ This does not mean that "being middle class or educated makes one braver or more able." But it does lead to the conclusion that the "chemistry of unit cohesion . . . requires a blend of talents and backgrounds"--with the increased participation of "middle-class and upwardly mobile youth."¹⁵⁹ Unfortunately for blacks, proportionately more whites happen to fall into the category of better-educated, middle class, and upwardly mobile youth.

Race riots at military installations in the South just prior to World War I brought another legacy to perceptions concerning blacks and the military--mainly, the feeling that military-civilian clashes or internal, racially motivated uprisings would eventually become frequent and quite serious. The infamous "Brownsville Affray" of 1906--when black soldiers allegedly rioted in protest against their treatment by the townspeople of Brownsville, Texas--was one of the most publicized incidents of the period. The Brownsville episode ended with President Theodore Roosevelt ordering the dishonorable discharge of three entire black companies

¹⁵⁸Charles C. Moskos and John H. Faris, "Beyond the Marketplace: National Service and the AVF," in Toward A Consensus on Military Service, Goodpaster et al., eds., p. 138.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

without trial by court-martial (an action that was ultimately reversed by the Army and by Congress in the early 1970s).¹⁶⁰

The "legacy" was reinforced eleven years later when a more violent, if less well-known, incident involving the men of the all-black 24th Infantry occurred in Houston, Texas. In retaliation for their own mistreatment and the alleged abuse of a black woman by white policemen, more than a hundred members of the Army unit mutinied against their officers, seized rifles and ammunition by force, and marched upon downtown Houston. Several policemen, citizens, and soldiers were killed, and many more were wounded.¹⁶¹ The War Department reacted by indicting 118 black soldiers and convicting all but eight on charges of murder and mutiny. Thirteen men were subsequently hanged in a "speedy execution," apparently for the benefit of the townspeople; another six soldiers were later hanged; 63 were sentenced to life imprisonment; and the rest were given dishonorable discharges and prison terms ranging from two to fifteen years.¹⁶²

A major problem faced by blacks in the Armed Forces during the late 1950s stemmed from the racism that prevailed in many communities surrounding military installations. Black service members not only faced the hostility of many civilians, but had

¹⁶⁰Marvin Fletcher, The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891-1917 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 119-152; and Foner, Blacks and the Military, pp. 96-103.

¹⁶¹Edgar A. Shuler, "The Houston Race Riot, 1917," in Allen D. Grimshaw, ed., Racial Violence in the United States (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 73-87. In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal observed: "During his entire military history in the country, the Negro has experienced numerous humiliations of various kinds. He has been abused because of his race by many white officers, by white soldiers and by white civilians. There have been race riots in or around camps. The Negro soldier has usually been punished most severely when he was only one offender among many, and sometimes even when he was the victim. See An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1944), p. 421.

¹⁶²Foner, Blacks and the Military, pp. 113-116.

difficulty finding decent living accommodations, restaurants, and schools. Although the Pentagon was acutely aware of this discrimination, there was "no evidence that the Department of Defense ever worked for blacks off the post before the 1960s."¹⁶³

A special study group during the Truman Administration documented many of the problems faced by blacks. Later, under President Kennedy, the Pentagon began to take a more active role in dealing with off-base discrimination. Other steps were also taken to change the racial climate that seemed to surround most military installations.¹⁶⁴

Concerns about racial conflict surfaced again in the late 1960s. Indeed, incidents with racial overtones seemed to plague the Vietnam period. Among the most widely publicized were a race riot by prisoners in a stockade at Long Binh, Vietnam in 1968 and incidents aboard several Navy vessels (including the aircraft carriers Kitty Hawk and Constellation, the assault ship Sumpter, and the Hassayampa, an oiler, all during the year 1972). Even the Air Force, which had been virtually free of racial problems, saw its share of trouble. Four days of rioting in May 1971 at Travis Air Force Base were ignited by racial incidents on the installation. The Travis riot resulted in the arrest of 110 blacks and 25 whites, and more than 30 Air Force personnel were treated for injuries.¹⁶⁵ Serious racial clashes also beset the Marine Corps at Camp Lejeune (July 1969) and at Kanehoe Naval Air Station, Hawaii (August 1969).¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978), p. 155.

¹⁶⁴See President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, Equality of Treatment and Opportunity for Negro Military Personnel Stationed Within the United States: Initial Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 5, 12, 14.

¹⁶⁵Gropman, Air Force Integrates, pp. 215-216.

¹⁶⁶Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Impacts on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 344.

The threat of racial unrest has diminished greatly over the past decade. However, there is some evidence that many youths entering the all-volunteer military are coming from the most segregated areas of civilian life where there is little if any interracial contact. This trend has apparently contributed to a disturbing increase in Ku Klux Klan-type activities. In fact, just a few years ago racial incidents involving the KKK were reported on the aircraft carrier Independence, the supply ship Concord, and the carrier America.¹⁶⁷ There have also been reports of KKK activities at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Carson, Colorado, and among Army troops stationed in Europe.¹⁶⁸ Though still far from widespread, the increase in klanism in the Armed Forces is seen as a dangerous omen and a sad reminder of times past.

The third "legacy" of World War I was the establishment of aptitude tests as a primary basis for screening and assigning new recruits. These tests, it is noted, were used by some members of the scientific community as "indisputable proof" that blacks are genetically inferior to whites. And, it was widely taught in the military that "the mental capabilities of most Negroes were slight and . . . this fact would make their utilization in a future mobilization very difficult."¹⁶⁹ A "typical" study in the 1920s by the Army War College attributed the relatively poor performance of blacks on the military's mental test to the apparently smaller size of their cranial cavity--while those blacks who did score

¹⁶⁷Blain Harden, "Sailors Wearing Sheets Create Racial Incident Aboard Aircraft Carrier," Washington Post, 6 September 1979; John Stevenson, "Navy Ships, Racial Tension is Under Guarded Control," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 November 1979; and "KKK Activity Investigated Aboard Atlantic Fleet Ships," Washington Star, 1 July 1979.

¹⁶⁸These particular cases have been reported in Army Times (13 August 1979) and St. Louis Post-Dispatch (7 December 1980). See also Wedekind, "GIs in the Klan." A more recent account of the alleged participation by soldiers and marines in KKK activities can be found in Daniel Greene, "DoD Studies Policy on Racist Group Membership," Army Times, 9 June 1986, p. 19.

¹⁶⁹Coates and Pellegrin, Military Sociology, p. 342.

well on intelligence tests, the study further concluded, evidently possessed a "heavy strain of white blood."¹⁷⁰

Military manpower analysts, social scientists, and the general public still ponder the very wide gap between the average test scores of blacks and whites. This was well illustrated by the manner in which the popular media treated findings from the "Profile of American Youth" study (nationwide administration of the military's enlistment test to a representative sample of young men and women in 1980). The Washington Post of 21 February 1982 was the first to reveal the results of the study in a front-page article entitled "Blacks Score Below Whites in Pentagon Test." A Baltimore Sun article was captioned "Pentagon Calm at Test Gap of Whites, Blacks, Hispanics"; while the Chicago Sun Times ran a headline stating (erroneously) "Blacks Score Half as Well as Whites in Pentagon Test."¹⁷¹

The real story of the "Profile of American Youth," the truly new finding, as the New York Times correctly observed, was that "Volunteers in Armed Forces Test 'Above Average'." The Christian Science Monitor also took a much more subdued approach to the study results in its article, titled "Pentagon Finds Recruits

¹⁷⁰The Army Report is quoted in Gropman, Air Force Integrates, p. 2.

¹⁷¹See Mark J. Eitelberg, Zahava D. Doering, and Wayne S. Sellman, "Government Scientists Meet the Press: Reactions to the Release of the 'Profile of American Youth'," in Department of Defense, The Profile of American Youth Study: Results and Implications, Technical Memorandum 82-2 (Washington, D.C.: Directorate of Accession Policy, September 1982). The Washington Post article was the subject of some harsh criticism by its readers--leading the Washington Post ombudsman to later offer a public apology on behalf of the paper. The headline and story were "tilted," he wrote; the article probably received too much attention as the lead story on the day it appeared; and it took too much play away from the "principal conclusion of the test: that the All-Volunteer Force is 'above average.'" (Cited in *ibid.*) The Associated Press (AP) later retracted its wire service report, stating that "the story had erroneously mixed percentile ratings with percentage scores." The AP also presented a brief explanation of percentile scores along with a description of the average scores of whites and blacks--in what amounted to a very unusual "news" article.

More 'Trainable': "In general, those who join the Armed Services score a bit higher than the national average on qualification tests measuring 'trainability'."¹⁷² At the same time, at another extreme, were articles captioned "Study Revives Ethnic Inferiority Controversy" and columnists claiming that the study marked "a return to the American-style racism that had diminished long ago"--a "comeback" for theories of genetic inferiority so that the new captains of social and economic America can build a case for renewed racial segregation.¹⁷³

A major portion of the initial analyses of the "Profile" study was devoted to a comparison of the test scores of selected subgroups. The demographic variables used to differentiate population subgroups were age, sex, race/ethnicity, level of education, socioeconomic status, and geographic region. The results of the subgroup comparisons were generally consistent with the findings of published research on aptitude and achievement tests--demonstrating again the very wide differences between the test scores of whites and ethnic or racial minorities, particularly blacks.¹⁷⁴

Disadvantaged youths and minorities will clearly have more to lose from a "hiring" system that emphasizes academic achievement and skills in reading and test taking. Reading skills and other test-taking talents are strongly influenced by the individual's educational experiences, in terms of both the quality and quantity of schooling received, as well as by any special social, cultural, or economic factors that affect the learning process. The disturbing truth for disadvantaged youths and minorities is that educational opportunities in this country are not equally

¹⁷²Eitelberg, Doering, and Sellman, "Government Scientists," p. 84.

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 85. The referenced article appeared in the St. Paul (Mn.) Pioneer Press. The column, entitled "Genetic Inferiority Returns," was published in the Chicago Tribune.

¹⁷⁴See Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth.

distributed across socioeconomic, geographic, or cultural boundaries; and any system that stresses skills stemming directly from education is bound to favor one population group over another.

In the working world of the modern military, selection standards operate to make it far less likely that blacks (than whites) will qualify for enlistment--and, when qualified, will be eligible for the more preferred jobs. The stumbling block for blacks and other minorities appears to be the aptitude test, a direct descendant of the exams that guided the fate of black recruits over seven decades ago.

Technically, the military's selection standards are as close to being "color blind" as current scientific knowledge will permit. The Armed Services are an "equal opportunity employer" of the highest order, where all individuals, regardless of background, are treated with fairness and impartiality under prevailing laws. Nevertheless, everyone carries a certain amount of demographic cargo; and young people who seek to join the military must bring with them at least 18 or 19 or more years of developmental history, which, far from being fair, controls their competitive position beside fellow job-seekers.

There can be no question that present enlistment requirements have a profound effect on the racial and socioeconomic content of the military and its occupational components. This is the inadvertent result of a system that is neither intended nor equipped to right the wrongs of the social order; a system that must annually screen over 700,000 applicants, most of whom have never held a previous job, in a mechanical, homogenized, and basically dispassionate fashion; and a system that must rely on standardized tests which are equitable and proper, yet so greatly varying in their difficulty for different groups of people.

In modern practice, it is hard to conceive of a large-scale hiring operation capable of producing a purely "color blind" work force. Employers may evaluate all job applicants without bias--on an individual basis--but all job applicants are obviously not

equally qualified for every position. Any impartial employment method short of random choice, then, will inevitably reflect existing social or racial inequities. The military places great importance on the results of the enlistment test because standardized testing can be more objective than most other screening methods. However, the fact remains: blacks and whites are divided by an average test score gap of striking dimensions (an AFQT percentile score of 56 for whites compared with a score of 24 for blacks); and enlistment requirements that stress test performance will tend to favor whites over blacks as a group.¹⁷⁵

The Armed Services still emerge from American history as trail blazers for minority rights. Though change for the better has frequently been strained and slow, no other public or private institution in the country can match the great strides for racial fairness taken by the military since the 1950s. No major employer of young people in this nation, for example, is more aware of the problems of cultural bias in testing than the Department of Defense. Selection and assignment practices have been held up to considerable public scrutiny over the last thirty years, largely because of two factors or conditions of modern military service. First, the nature of the military's mission, in war or peace, places it in full public view, exposed to the watchful eyes of the popular media, special interest groups, the legislature, and others; and the great turnover of personnel from one year to the next creates an avenue of contact with the civilian community. Second, the end of the draft helped to open the doors of military service even wider for minorities and women; and at the same time, concerns over the consequences of all-volunteer recruitment have led to a profusion of research on manpower policy and practice.

Some observers may still fault the military for allowing blacks and other minorities to be clustered in "soft" jobs, or those positions that are lower in the skill-level or technical

¹⁷⁵Aptitude test scores are from *ibid.*, p. 35.

hierarchy. At first glance, a proponent of equal opportunity could make the case that the job opportunities for blacks are somewhat less than equal to the job opportunities for whites (or, for that matter, other minorities). Yet, there are indications that black young men have taken a significant step forward in gaining assignment to the so-called "better" jobs over the past several years in all Services; and, even though there are persistent disparities between the job experiences of blacks and whites, blacks are now achieving access to the more preferred military jobs in much greater proportion than the glaring differences in aptitude test performance would lead one to expect. It is also true that blacks and whites are probably more "equal" in the military than they are in most areas of civilian working life.

On the military's behalf, too, it should be emphasized that all conceivable efforts have been made to keep racial partiality in aptitude test results to a minimum. The Department of Defense has vigorously endeavored to create a fair and effective enlistment test, and independent testing experts have consistently given the examination high marks. Furthermore, there is evidence that the test and its various components are accurate predictors of individual performance in training; while "studies of the differential validity of the ASVAB tests in male and female and White and Black subpopulations show no real evidence of bias, either favorable or unfavorable, to members of any of these groups."¹⁷⁶

Critics have reproached the military for relying so heavily and for so long on aptitude standards that apparently work to the detriment of certain groups over others (a situation that is destined to change before the close of this century).¹⁷⁷ In the

¹⁷⁶R. Darrel Bock and Elsie G.J. Moore, The Profile of American Youth: Demographic Influences on ASVAB Test Performance (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], February 1984), p. 96.

¹⁷⁷See, for example, Department of Defense, First Annual Report to Congress on Joint-Service Efforts to Link Enlistment Standards and Job Performance (Washington, D.C.: Office of the

meantime, there is no denying that minorities, especially blacks, will continue to collect a smaller share than whites of most opportunities the military has to offer. This is not necessarily an indictment of the military's methods or selection devices, which are carefully conceived. It is, rather, a realization that certain inequities still exist in the nation's social, economic, and educational fabric from which the military must shape its force; that the military is just a part of the nation's framework, an agent of the government, reflecting in varied degrees the best as well as the worst of its parent setting. It is also a recognition that many currents of thought, some clearly racist, others drawn from ignorance or misunderstanding, have persistently followed the military through its entire past; and these currents, it appears, may continue to run for some time to come.

5. CONCLUDING NOTE: LOOKING AHEAD

Proponents of population representation in the American Armed Forces call upon three basic principles to argue their position: (1) There is a need to have a legitimate military of "citizen-soldiers" who can "re-present" the variety of community interests and recreate the social contour of American life; (2) There must be a fair or equitable system of military service, where the benefits and burdens (or the rights and responsibilities) of national defense are distributed justly throughout society; and (3) Military membership must ensure a capable, cohesive, and effective fighting force (in symbol as well as in deed).

"Race," defined as white and black, is an important element of population representation in the American military for several reasons. In the earliest days of this country, blacks were barred from service or used very sparingly--and only in the most expedient circumstances. After a long history of recruitment quotas designed

Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], December 1982).

to exclude blacks, the Armed Forces gradually removed their racial barriers and allowed blacks the "right to fight" in two Asian wars. Now, under a system of all-volunteer recruitment, the proportion of blacks serving in the enlisted ranks is extraordinarily high. In the short span of thirty years, the American military has moved from segregation and exclusion of blacks to equal opportunity and the prospect of a fighting force filled with racial and ethnic minorities.

Many proponents of statistical parity believe that the most effective, fair, and legitimate military forces are those that mirror society. More importance is placed on certain groups than on the individuals who constitute these groups because it is a custom of American life; the awareness of race differences is a part of the history, law, and symbolism of the nation. As long as there are tensions and fissures in American race relations, people will ask whether black and white soldiers can live and fight together. As long as being black means being poor and unemployed, concerned individuals will question the equity and legitimacy of disproportionately black armies. And as long as there is race consciousness, ethnic identification, and the recurrent threat or reality of race riots, white doubts about the loyalty of black troops will remain.

The Armed Forces are periodically perceived by faultfinders as a place in which "the very poor, the ill-educated, the hapless, the hopeless, and by some accounts, the incompetent, are paid to do the defending the rest of us are loathe to do."¹⁷⁸ This perception has helped to push the military closer than ever before toward a new system of conscription. "Some critics . . . complain that an all-volunteer military will become increasingly unrepresentative of American society," Newsweek notes. And, "if the

¹⁷⁸Richard Cohen, "Draft," Washington Post, 28 July 1981, p. B-1.

President's plans for a massive [defense] buildup move ahead on schedule, a return to the draft seems all but inevitable."¹⁷⁹

New military pay raises, intensified recruiting efforts, a surge of national pride, a depressed civilian job market (especially for teenagers), and other factors have combined to make the early 1980s an exceptional recruiting success for the All-Volunteer Force. During the past few years, all Services have either met or exceeded their active duty recruiting objectives. The "quality" of new enlistees is better than ever before, along with record-high reenlistment rates, and with another wave of qualified applicants waiting in the wings. Enlistments of minorities have dropped considerably, as rising youth unemployment finds whites filling in for their fellow job-seekers who have lower average test scores and less education. By most accounts, the Armed Forces tapped the mother lode of qualified volunteers, with practically peak conditions for recruiting and ten years of experience without a draft to guide the way.

The latest "successes" of the military are described by some observers as "fragile." They may turn around overnight and arouse the nation right into a peacetime draft.¹⁸⁰ Yet, if any new form of conscription is ever devised, it will certainly not resemble the Selective Service of the 1960s. The issues of "representation" once helped to end the draft; they have recently contributed to an erosion of support for the volunteer concept; and they will act to ensure that a reinstitution of compulsory service will never again allow the sons (and, possibly, daughters) of more comfortable American families to hide away behind the convenient deferments and exemptions of an earlier era.

¹⁷⁹"Why a Draft Seems Certain," Newsweek, 8 June 1981, p. 39. See also Marvin Stone, "Is a Draft Inevitable?", Editorial, U.S. News & World Report, 13 July 1981, p. 80.

¹⁸⁰For evidence of this feeling, see Goodpaster et al., eds., Toward A Consensus on Military Service; and Jason Berger, ed., The Military Draft (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1981).

The next decade will see the American people struggle to resolve anew the difficult issues and conflicting priorities that embrace the demands of national security and go right to the heart of our national purpose. In the end, it will be the old philosophical balancing act of benefits against burdens, equal opportunity against disguised quotas and institutional discrimination, national defense needs against the social role of military service, the principles of free choice against government intrusions into private lives, civil rights against civic responsibilities, and so on through the familiar list of clashing values.

The modern Armed Forces may have an enduring "problem"--but it will surely not be improved by those who endeavor to reconstruct the traditional barriers to blacks for "their own good and the good of the country." It is perhaps worth noting that blacks and disadvantaged minorities have been joining the Armed Forces in unprecedented numbers precisely because it is not a microcosm of society or "perfect portrait" of the American people. For all of its negative aspects and lingering racism, the American military stands in the forefront of racial integration and equal opportunity.

Radios and televisions blast forth the message of today's military: "Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines . . . We don't ask for experience; we give it." "Be all you can be," recruiting jingles herald, "in the Army." If all-volunteer recruitment is to survive, it must learn how to pull, even harder, the capable and qualified from the community-at-large. The challenge of the late 1980s and beyond lies also in the response of policymakers to the perceived demands of population representation; the same demands which, at once, call for fairness and harmony with American democratic ideals, and again, for a solid and effective national defense. The future of the volunteer military hangs now, precariously, in that balance.

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
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